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Abstract 
 
This dissertation comprises two essays; the first of which investigates sovereign 
credit risk interdependencies, while the second examines the reaction of corporate credit risk 
to sovereign credit risk events. The first essay titled, Characterizing Sovereign Credit Risk 
Interdependencies: Evidence from the Credit Default Swap Market, investigates the relationships that 
exist among disparate sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) and the implications on 
sovereign creditworthiness. We exploit emerging market sovereign CDS spreads to examine 
the reaction of sovereign credit risk to changes in country-specific and global financial 
factors. Utilizing a VAR model fitted with DCC GARCH, we find that comovements of 
spreads generally exhibit significant time-varying correlations, suggesting that spreads are 
commonly affected by global financial factors. We construct 19 country-specific commodity 
price indexes to instrument for country terms of trade, obtaining significant results. Our 
commodity price indexes account for significant variation in CDS spreads, controlling for 
global financial factors. In addition, sovereign spreads are found to be related to U.S. stock 
market returns and the VIX volatility risk premium global factors. Notwithstanding, our 
results suggest that terms of trade and commodity prices have a statistically and economically 
significant effect on the sovereign credit risk of emerging economies. Our results apply 
broadly to investors, financial institutions and policy makers motivated to utilize profitable 
factors in global portfolios. 
The second essay is titled, Differential Stock Market Returns and Corporate Credit Risk of 
Listed Firms. This essay explores the information transfer effect of shocks to sovereign credit 
risk as captured in the CDS and stock market returns of cross-listed and local stock 
exchange listed firms. Based on changes in sovereign credit ratings and outlooks, we find 
x 
 
that widening CDS spreads of firms imply that negative credit events dominate, whereas 
tightening spreads indicate positive events. Grouping firms into companies with cross-
listings and those without, we compare the spillover effects and find strong evidence of 
contagion across equity and CDS markets in both company groupings. Our findings suggest 
that the sensitivity of corporate CDS prices to sovereign credit events is significantly larger 
for non-cross-listed firms. Possible reasons for this finding could in fact be due to cross-
listed firms‟ better access to external capital and less degree of asymmetric information, 
relative to non-cross-listed peers with lower level of investor recognition. Our results 
provide new evidence relevant to investors and financial institutions in determining 
sovereign credit risk germane to corporate financial risk, for the construction of debt and 
equity portfolios, and hedging considerations in today‟s dynamic environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: VAR DCC GARCH; Credit Default Swaps; Corporate credit risk; Sovereign 
risk; Cross-listing; Commodity Prices; Terms of Trade
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ESSAY ONE 
 
Characterizing Sovereign Credit Risk Interdependencies: Evidence from the Credit 
Default Swap Market 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We exploit emerging market sovereign CDS spreads to examine the reaction of sovereign 
credit risk to changes in country-specific and global financial factors. Utilizing a VAR model 
fitted with DCC GARCH, we find that comovements of spreads generally exhibit significant 
time-varying correlations, suggesting that spreads are commonly affected by global financial 
factors. We construct 19 country-specific commodity price indexes to instrument for 
country terms of trade, obtaining significant results. Our commodity price indexes account 
for significant variation in CDS spreads, controlling for global financial factors. In addition, 
sovereign spreads are found to be related to U.S. stock market returns and the VIX volatility 
risk premium global factors. Notwithstanding, our results suggest that terms of trade and 
commodity prices have a statistically and economically significant effect on the sovereign 
credit risk of emerging economies. Our results apply broadly to investors, financial 
institutions and policy makers motivated to utilize profitable factors in global portfolios.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: F34, G13, G12, G15, P34 
Keywords:  Credit Default Swaps, Commodity Prices, Terms of Trade, DCC GARCH, 
Vector Autoregressive (VAR) 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The financial sector took heavy losses following sovereign debt crises that occurred 
in a number of countries in recent years. Particularly intriguing, was the Eurozone debt 
crisis, in light of the long-held notion that developed countries were supposedly immune 
from sovereign debt crisis. Compared to developed countries, several emerging economies 
have a higher dependence on commodity exports, some of which have recently suffered 
highly volatile and depressed prices and directly affect a country‟s terms of trade. In this 
essay, we therefore analyze emerging market sovereign CDS spreads to examine the reaction 
of sovereign credit risk to changes in country-specific factors and global financial factors.  
We propose a VAR model fitted with DCC GARCH to determine if CDS spreads 
have significant correlations. Significant correlations of spreads suggest that changes in the 
sovereign credit risk of disparate, far-flung countries are commonly affected by a set of 
global financial factors. We also investigate country specific factors; particularly terms of 
trade, due to the possibility that shocks to terms of trade might affect a country‟s ability to 
service its debt. It is possible that both terms of trade and a set of global financial factors 
have significant roles in explaining changes in sovereign CDS spreads. Prior research on 
sovereign CDS spreads had not taken into account the effect of terms of trade but primarily 
focused on global financial factors. Previous findings in the literature have underlined the 
importance of global factors. (Longstaff et al., 2005; Pan and Singleton, 2008; Longstaff, et 
al., 2011). Overall, our analysis determines the significance of the interrelationships of 
various sovereign CDS spreads and also makes conclusions on the degree of importance of 
both terms of trade and a set of global financial factors, simultaneously analyzed over time.   
A CDS is a derivative that transfers the credit risk of bonds between two parties. It 
provides the buyer of the contract, who sometimes owns the underlying bonds, with 
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protection against default, a credit rating downgrade, or other adverse credit events. 
Sovereign CDS derivatives present an opportunity to take a short position in a country‟s 
sovereign debt, whereas, it is difficult to directly short a country‟s bonds. The opportunity to 
go long or short on a sovereign credit presents new information about sovereign credit risk 
to the market.  
By the end of 2014, the notional value of CDS stood at $6 trillion for contracts 
referencing non-financial firms, $4 trillion for financial firms, $4 trillion for multiple sectors, 
and $2 trillion for those referencing sovereigns. By rating, CDS contracts referencing 
investment grade entities totalled $10 trillion and those referencing lower-rated or unrated 
entities stood at $7 trillion. With respect to sovereign CDS contracts, the volume of 
contracts has increased steadily since the global financial crisis. The share of such contracts 
in the total notional amount of credit derivatives outstanding rose from 4% at the end-2008 
to 16% by mid- 2015. In absolute terms, the notional amount of sovereign CDS contracts 
grew from $1.7 trillion at the end of 2008 to $3.0 trillion at the end of 2011. Thereafter, it 
declined to $2.0 trillion as of end-2015.1  
Following the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 and the ensuing Eurozone debt crisis, 
it became clear that sovereign credit risk was of important concern in developed and 
emerging economies. Prior to the financial crisis, sovereign credit risk was not a serious 
concern in developed countries. The bailouts of a number of European developed countries 
has made it integral to understand the nature of sovereign credit risk, particularly in emerging 
economies. Relative to a group of developing and developed economies, we examine closely 
related questions surrounding the comovements of sovereign CDS and factors causing 
changes in sovereign credit risk.  
                                                 
1 Bank for International Settlements: Statistical release - OTC derivatives statistics, December 2015 
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1. First, how correlated is sovereign credit risk and what do the correlations imply? We 
find significant correlations, suggesting that sovereign CDS spreads are commonly 
affected by global financial factors.  
2. Second, controlling for global financial factors, what is the role of terms of trade in 
determining the CDS spreads of the sovereign? Previous findings in the literature 
have underlined the importance of global factors. It is therefore important to analyze 
the relationship of sovereign credit risk with terms of trade, in the context of global 
factors. In this regard, we obtain novel results on the significant effect of terms of 
trade on sovereign CDS spreads, after we control for global factors.  
3. Third, taking terms of trade into consideration, do global financial factors play an 
important role in igniting sovereign credit risk? We expect that global financial 
factors and terms of trade both play an important role.  
Terms of trade measures the price of a country‟s exports relative to imports, 
calculated as the ratio of export prices to import prices. To instrument for terms of trade, we 
construct country-specific export weighted commodity price indexes. Global financial 
factors fall into the categories of, (i) volatility risk premium, measured as the difference 
between CBOE U.S. VIX option volatility index and historical volatility, typically viewed as a 
measure of event risk and volatility risk premium, (ii) the spread between the U.S. BB-rated 
corporate bond index and the 6-month U.S. Treasury bill rate, viewed as a measure of both 
U.S. macroeconomic and global financial market developments, (iii) U.S. stock market 
return. For the aforesaid variables, we use panel techniques to determine the significance of 
the relationships to the variability of the sovereign CDS spreads of several countries. 
There are two main sections in this essay. In the first section, we utilize Dynamic 
Conditional Correlation Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (DCC 
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GARCH) methodology to analyze the comovements of 5 sovereign CDS spreads of Brazil, 
Mexico, Panama, Venezuela and Ecuador, and find that they generally exhibit significant 
correlations. By doing so, our initial results on the time-varying correlations suggest that 
sovereign CDS spreads are commonly affected by global factors. Sources of some of this 
commonality are explored in some of the literature including, Jun Pan and Kenneth 
Singleton (2008); Iuliana Ismailescu and Hossein Kazemi (2010); Francis Longstaff, et al. 
(2011), and some others. In the second part of this essay, we study the sources of the strong 
commonality, focusing on the effect of country-specific fundamentals and global financial 
factors on changes in sovereign CDS spreads for a group of 19 emerging market countries. 
Given the nature of several sovereign debt crises, contagion and cross-border 
spillovers of credit risk have been studied in the literatrue. These can be amplified when 
there are high correlations between the credit risk of different countries. The first part of this 
essay focuses on studying the correlations of several sovereign CDS spreads to one another. 
We carry this out by investigating the co-movement of the sovereign CDS spreads of several 
countries by employing a second order vector autoregressive (VAR) model fitted with DCC 
GARCH, as proposed by Engle (2002). The concept of comovement has been well 
documented by many researchers. Engle (2002) documents how time varying correlations 
may be estimated with multivariate GARCH models, now commonly used to study 
interdependencies amongst several economic variables. He develops a new class of 
multivariate dynamic conditional correlation models, which in addition to incorporating the 
flexibility of univariate GARCH models, include parsimonious parametric models for the 
correlations. They are not linear but can often be estimated quite simply with univariate or 
two-step methods based on the likelihood function. He shows that they perform well in a 
variety of situations. 
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Our binary results show that the pairwise correlations between countries are strongly 
significant and the variance of residuals from the VAR model is persistent over time. The 
multivariate DCC GARCH model also reveals consistent results. We explore the volatility of 
changes in the sovereign CDS spreads of Brazil, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela and Ecuador 
and the relationship of volatility to local stock market returns and the CBOE VIX index. In 
this respect, we do not fnd evidence of a significant relationship. Employing DCC GARCH, 
we contribute to the literature on the interdependency and co-movement of CDS, as 
previous research utilized simple VAR or error correction models to implement co-
movements. With DCC GARCH, we show a dynamic moving correlation among various 
variables. Our results suggests strong commonality in the behavior of sovereign CDS 
spreads. 
Expanding the sample to 19 countries, we then exploit panel regressions to study the 
sources of the variation in sovereign CDS spreads, exploring global financial factors and 
country terms of trade. Our results validate the importance of global financial factors and 
also confirm the prominence of terms of trade and commodity prices in explaining changes 
in sovereign CDS spreads, particularly in emerging economies. Since terms of trade drive a 
country‟s capacity to generate revenue and service its sovereign debt, we expect a significant 
effect on the sovereign CDS spreads of emerging economies. The sample of 19 sovereigns 
includes countries that are commodity-dependent, more diversified countries, developing 
countries and developed economies. The importance of terms of trade to emerging 
economies is apparent in more extreme cases of resource-reliant countries, such as oil-
producing Venezuela‟s potential reaction to oil prices. Terms of trade can be interpreted as 
the amount of import goods a country can purchase per unit of export goods. If export 
revenues are spent on imports, debt service capacity is conceivably enhanced when 
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commodity prices are high. In the case of Venezuela, oil revenues are denominated in 
dollars, therefore negative impacts on its earnings of foreign exchange could potentially limit 
its ability to service dollar-denominated external debt. In extreme cases, multiple significant 
shocks to commodity prices may compel a resource dependent country to reschedule debt 
repayments.  
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on CDS was sparse prior to 2003, due to data limitations. Our research 
aims to contribute to a number of threads of CDS research. First, we aim to contribute to 
the strand of research that explores the relationship between CDS and other assets. Hull et 
al. (2004), investigate the relationship between CDS spreads and bond yields, and reach 
conclusions on the benchmark risk-free rate and credit rating on the credit ratings 
announcement date. Blanco et al. (2005) test the theoretical equivalence of CDS prices and 
credit spreads originally derived by Duffie (1999), finding support for the parity relation as 
an equilibrium condition. They also find two forms of deviation from parity. For three firms, 
CDS prices are substantially higher than expected over long periods of time, hence they 
argue that the mispricing is mainly driven by imperfect contract specification and 
measurement errors when computing the credit default spread. Similar to our study of the 
co-movements of several sovereign CDSs, Norden and Weber (2009) study the co-
movement among stock market, bond and CDS variables. They conclude that stock returns 
lead changes in CDS and bond spreads and this relationship is stronger for US firms than it 
is for European firms. Hassan et al. (2013) investigate the link between the price discovery 
dynamics in sovereign CDS and bond markets and the degree of financial integration of 
8 
 
emerging markets. They find that sovereign CDS and bond markets are co-integrated. In five 
out of seven sovereigns (71%), the bond market leads price discovery by adjusting before 
CDS spreads to new information regarding credit risk. 
Additionally, we aim to extend previous results from the sovereign bond literature, 
relative to the effects of terms of trade on sovereign credits and risk. Catao and Kapur 
(2006) provide evidence that differences in terms of trade are important for determining 
sovereign bond yields, borrowing constraints and default risk. Our study is in the spirit of 
studies on sovereign credit and terms of trade including, Jens Hilscher and Yves Nosbusch 
(2010), who draw inferences on sovereign credit risk by relating terms of trade to sovereign 
bond yields. Using their results as a general guide, we extend this thread of the literature by 
relating terms of trade to sovereign CDS spreads, following the consensus in the literature 
that CDS spreads, rather than bond yields, can incorporate more precise and timely 
information about credit risk (Hull, Predescu, White (2004). Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh 
(2005), Stulz (2010)). CDS spreads consist of firm bid and offer quotes from dealers, which 
dealers are obligated to trade at the quoted price. Hull, et al. (2004) argue that CDS data is 
attractive compared to bond yield data because yields consist of merely indications from 
dealers, as opposed to commitments or an obligation to trade at a quoted price. Hilscher and 
Nosbusch (2010) construct country-specific commodity price indexes instrumenting for 
terms of trade, and find a significant relationship to sovereign bond yields and a substantial 
increase in the adjusted R2 of the regressions that include the terms of trade variable, 
compared to specifications that only include global variables and credit ratings. To our 
knowledge, there has not been a study relating terms of trade to sovereign CDS spreads, 
which we exploit in our main analysis. 
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We contribute to a third thread of the literature which investigates the sources of 
commonality found in CDS markets. This has been explored in some articles, including Jun 
Pan and Kenneth Singleton (2008), Iuliana Ismailescu and Hossein Kazemi (2010), Francis 
Longstaff, et al. (2011) and some others. Pan and Singleton (2008) show significant 
correlations among the sovereign CDS spreads of Mexico, Turkey, and Korea and 
demonstrate that they are commonly related to the volatility of the U.S. stock market as 
measured by the VIX index. Further, the VIX index can be viewed as a barometer for event 
risk and reflects investors‟ sentiment regarding exposure to high yield bonds, often the 
designated credit class of emerging economies. Following Pan and Singleton (2008),we use 
the difference between U.S. BB-rated corporate bonds and the 6-month U.S. Treasury bill 
rate as a measure of both U.S. macroeconomic and global financial market developments. In 
addition to Pan and Singleton (2008), Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008) find significant results 
supporting the view that VIX is related to changes in sovereign CDS and is an indicator of 
investor sentiment and appetite for global event risk. Longstaff, et al. (2011) show that U.S. 
stock market return is more often significant in explaining variation in sovereign credit 
spreads than local stock market returns. Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) identify the 
transmission mechanisms of spillovers as the common creditor problem and competition in 
trade markets. Improved credit ratings of a sovereign is found to have positive effects on 
other sovereigns‟ borrowing from a common creditor, due to increased access to capital. For 
an emerging economy, their findings suggest an increase in credit rating has negative effects 
on countries that exercise the same level of competition in trade markets. 
The remainder of this essay is structured as follows. In section 2, we describe the 
data. Section 3 explains the VAR DCC GARCH model, the results and alternative tests.  
10 
 
Section 4 provides a panel model to simultaneously test terms of trade, global factors, as well 
as other controls and expounds key results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
3. THE DATA 
We obtain daily and monthly sovereign CDS spreads from Thomson Reuters. In our 
DCC GARCH model, we utilize daily sovereign CDS spread data from 5 countries. For our 
analysis of terms of trade and global factors, we expand our analysis to 19 countries, using 
monthly series, based on the availability of data. For our DCC GARCH model, we obtain 
each country‟s stock market index and the S&P 500 implied volatility index from Bloomberg 
using the same data span. We use the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) emerging 
market indexes for Brazil and Mexico, and the individual local stock market indexes for 
Panama, Venezuela and Ecuador. We then merge all the series by deleting specific day 
observations with missing variables. We calculate the change in each series by taking the log 
difference between the current value and lag value of each variable.  
Our latter model specifications test the significance of terms of trade and global 
factors using monthly series for a sample of 19 countries: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia 
South Africa, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine and Venezuela. We select the longest available time 
series for the countries. Broadly, the CDS data starts from October 2000 going through 
October 2013. For each country, we construct an export weighted commodity price index. 
We obtain country commodity export value data from the UN COMTRADE database and 
monthly commodity prices from the World Bank commodity price database. To construct 
the indexes, we weigh the commodity prices by the country specific export shares. We 
11 
 
calculate the spread between the return on U.S. BB-rated industrial corporate bonds and the 
6-month U.S. Treasury bill rate, using data obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis. We compute the realized volatility of the S&P 500 index and obtain the implied VIX 
index from Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). We then calculate the monthly 
changes in the spreads between implied and realized volatility for index options to proxy for 
event risk and investor sentiment. The U.S. stock market excess return on all firms listed on 
the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
database is provided courtesy of Ken French. 
Table 1a provides summary information for the 19 sovereign CDS premiums in the 
sample. All premiums are denominated in basis points. The values of the premiums range 
widely across countries. Across the sample, the daily sovereign CDS spreads of the 19 
economies range from a minimum of 2.55 basis points (bps) for Spain to the maximum of 
5304.89 for Ukraine. The lowest average in the sample is 64.59 bps for China while Ecuador 
has the highest average of 1982.56 bps. The standard deviations, minimum and maximum 
values suggest wide variation in the sovereign CDS spreads in the sample. For example, the 
cost of credit protection for Ukraine ranges from 126.13 to 5304.89 basis points during the 
sample period. The sovereign CDS spreads of Spain grows by a multiple of 251, from March 
2007 to July 2012. Table 1b focuses on the 5 countries included in our DCC GARCH 
model, namely Brazil, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela and Ecuador. The daily mean returns of 
sovereign CDS spreads are all less than 0.1 percent per day. The returns fluctuate 
considerably and range from -74 percent (Ecuador) to 37 percent (Brazil). 
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Table 1a: 19-country Sample Summary Statistics 
 
 
Country Mean SD
Standard 
Error
Minimum Median Maximum Kurtos is Skewness Range N Sample Period
Argentina 1128.84 1019.26 18.37 182.53 787.50 4689.08 1.32 1.49 4506.55 3079 06/05 - 11/13
Brazi l 427.63 622.71 9.36 61.50 161.59 3951.50 10.26 3.11 3890.00 4428 10/01 - 11/13
Bulgaria 212.77 161.56 2.34 13.22 197.10 697.50 -0.07 0.78 684.28 4781 10/00 - 11/13
China 64.59 47.28 0.75 10.00 62.00 276.30 2.19 1.37 266.30 3959 01/03 - 11/13
Colombia 226.15 155.46 2.47 64.70 152.92 850.00 1.79 1.50 785.30 3959 01/03 - 11/13
Ecuador 1982.56 1464.93 28.26 166.75 2300.03 4431.50 -0.99 0.55 4264.75 2687 07/06 - 11/13
Egypt 266.40 156.90 3.08 38.50 238.32 658.38 0.64 1.18 619.88 2590 10/06 - 11/13
Indones ia 224.80 131.50 2.28 92.26 189.62 1248.35 11.78 3.03 1156.09 3336 10/04 - 11/13
Mexico 139.27 83.67 1.26 28.17 116.05 601.21 2.86 1.62 573.04 4428 10/01 - 11/13
Panama 161.50 81.24 1.34 61.33 134.57 586.86 2.55 1.58 525.53 3676 11/03 - 11/13
Peru 176.28 97.27 1.60 59.66 141.13 605.83 2.88 1.74 546.17 3690 10/03 - 11/13
Phi l ippines 265.04 145.95 2.24 81.02 197.20 824.78 -0.81 0.70 743.76 4254 04/02 - 11/13
Poland 83.89 75.96 1.10 7.67 53.34 415.00 1.58 1.40 407.34 4785 10/00 - 11/13
Russ ia 267.51 239.53 3.46 36.88 180.70 1113.38 1.70 1.62 1076.50 4793 10/00 - 11/13
South Africa 148.44 81.92 1.18 24.57 148.42 663.33 4.70 1.45 638.76 4799 10/00 - 11/13
Spain 137.81 155.52 2.62 2.55 72.51 641.98 0.02 0.99 639.43 3513 04/04 - 11/13
Turkey 375.43 284.50 4.11 110.95 249.71 1416.88 1.01 1.43 1305.93 4793 10/00 - 11/13
Ukraine 678.74 737.28 12.67 126.13 492.65 5304.89 9.27 2.85 5178.76 3386 08/04 - 11/13
Venezuela 807.76 544.08 8.65 117.50 751.41 3239.28 2.78 1.35 3121.78 3959 01/03 - 11/13
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Table 1b: 5-Country Summary Statistics 
Variable Minimum Maximum Median Mean Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis N 
ΔCDSBrazil -0.2170 0.3762 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0306 0.9624 10.4101 4516 
ΔCDSVenezuela -0.1996 0.3629 0.0000 0.0001 0.0274 1.4206 20.1031 4516 
ΔCDSMexico -0.2468 0.3661 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0341 0.4799 7.1999 4516 
ΔCDSPanama -0.2018 0.3509 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0300 0.5588 8.6630 4516 
ΔCDSEcuador -0.7433 0.3313 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0302 -3.5183 111.1740 4516 
ΔrBRA -0.4826 0.2089 0.0006 0.0005 0.0240 -4.0797 87.2940 2994 
ΔrVEN -0.5143 0.3277 0.0003 0.0019 0.0230 -2.2155 116.8596 2994 
ΔrMEX -0.2915 0.2272 0.0009 0.0007 0.0187 -1.1267 40.4913 2994 
ΔrPAN -0.1126 0.1529 0.0000 0.0007 0.0084 4.2196 109.0236 2994 
ΔrECU -0.2593 0.3963 0.0000 0.0001 0.0183 2.4005 153.0976 2994 
ΔVIX -0.4368 0.6659 -0.0048 -0.0002 0.0713 0.9357 8.6241 2994 
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Within the sample time period, Δr (change in stock market returns) for each country 
varies dramatically from -48 percent (Brazil) to roughly 40 percent (Ecuador). 
Besides Mexico, no single country‟s daily mean stock market return exceeds 0.1 percent. 
Compared with the CDS premium returns, the stock market return in each country has 
higher kurtosis, suggesting that more extreme values are encountered in the stock market. 
Most countries‟ returns are negatively skewed, which indicates a more negative movement of 
the stock market. 
Part of the goal of this essay is to study the comovements of sovereign CDS spreads 
by ascertaining if time varying correlations among the sovereign CDS spreads of different 
countries are significant. This might lend credence to the argument that sovereign credit risk 
is commonly affected by a set of global trends. This part of the analysis and the DCC 
GARCH analysis will focus on 5 Latin American countries, namely Brazil, Mexico, Panama, 
Venezuela and Ecuador. There are a number of ways to compute the correlations of the 
sovereign CDS spreads and the results of the different methods reinforce each other. 
 
Binary Rolling Correlations 
To show the correlation of the sovereign CDS spreads of the 5 countries over time, we 
calculate a binary rolling correlation between each pair of countries with a rolling window of 
252 days, based on the number of trading days in a year. In each day, the correlation is 
calculated using the past one year percentage change in CDS.  
Overall the rolling correlation is highly varied over time for all country pairs. The 
correlations between the changes in sovereign CDS spreads of the largest economy in the 
sample, Brazil and that of other countries, have significant declines during the 2008 financial 
crisis, except for its correlation with Mexico. Interestingly, the correlation of the changes in 
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the Brazilian sovereign CDS spreads and that of Mexico is strong over time, as it never 
drops below 0.5, compared to the correlations of the Brazilian CDS spread with that of  
 
Figure 1: Country pairwise correlation of changes in sovereign CDS spreads 
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This figure shows a 252 day window rolling correlation measure 
between each country pair from 8/1/1996 to 11/21/2013. 
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other countries. We observe that this correlation between Brazil and Mexico continuously 
increases after 2001. For Mexico, the changes in sovereign CDS spreads generally have very 
low correlations (close to zero) with that of other countries during the time period of 1999-
2001, around the time of the peso crisis. All correlations decrease during the time period of 
1999 - 2002 and after the 2008 financial crisis. Altogether, we observe a theme of high 
positive correlations over time, which suggests that changes in sovereign CDS spreads are 
commonly affected by a set of factors. As a result, we investigate global financial factors later 
in this essay.  
 
Correlation coefficients matrix 
We calculate the correlation matrix of changes in sovereign CDS spreads for all five 
countries, provided in Table 2. First, all country pairwise correlations are significant. We 
observe that Brazil has its highest correlations with Mexico and Panama, where the 
correlations are both greater than 0.7. Similarly, Mexico has high correlations with Brazil and 
Panama and the correlation between Mexico and Panama is roughly 0.72.  
Ecuador has the lowest correlation with the other countries where no single 
correlation is greater than 0.45. Venezuela has moderate correlation with the four countries 
where the correlation ranges within 0.38 and 0.80.   
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Table 2: Correlation Coefficients Matrix for Change in CDS 
  ΔCDSBrazil ΔCDSVenezuela ΔCDSMexico ΔCDSPanama ΔCDSEcuador 
ΔCDSBrazil 
1.0000 0.6649*** 0.8072*** 0.7184*** 0.4500*** 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
ΔCDSVenezuela 
0.6649*** 1.0000 0.5915*** 0.5270*** 0.4421*** 
(<.0001) 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
ΔCDSMexico 
0.8072*** 0.5915*** 1.0000 0.7183*** 0.3862*** 
(<.0001) (<.0001) 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) 
ΔCDSPanama 
0.7184*** 0.5270*** 0.7183*** 1.0000 0.3563*** 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 
<.0001 
ΔCDSEcuador 
0.4500*** 0.4421*** 0.3862*** 0.3563*** 1.0000 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)   
Notes: The table reports correlation matrix of change in sovereign CDS spreads for all five 
countries. Numbers in the parenthesis are p-values. 
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4. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 DCC GARCH Methodology and Empirical Results 
To address interdependency among the changes in sovereign CDS spreads of the 5 
countries, we investigate the data using a VAR model fitted with multivariate DCC GARCH, 
proposed by Engle (2002). The DCC GARCH model is as follows: 
    ∑    
 
   
    
Here, Yt is the daily change in sovereign CDS spreads of each country and Xt-p are the lag 
terms of the dependent variables. 
 
     
   
   
     
   
    
   
 
           
              
     
                  ̃    ̃  
               (1) 
 
Equation 1 specifies the VAR model format and the preceding equations specify the 
GARCH format for the residuals from the estimated VAR model. Ht is the Cholesky factor 
of the time-varying conditional covariance matrix. Dt is a diagonal matrix of conditional 
variances. Rt is a matrix of conditional quasicorrelations expressed as: 
 
   (
       
   
       
) 
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We have a time-varying covariance matrix for the residuals from the VAR model and 
estimate the correlation matrix and λ1 and λ2 to determine if the residuals from VAR follow a 
GARCH (1, 1) process.  
 
4.1.1 Binary VAR Model with DCC GARCH 
First, we run a binary first order autoregressive model with DCC GARCH and 
estimate the pairwise correlations of the countries. From Table 3, it is evident that, 
irrespective of the country pairs used, all residuals are persistent, which indicates evidence of 
the GARCH (1, 1) process. λ1 and λ2 are highly significant at the 1 percent level. The 
correlations between all the country pairs are highly significant at the 1 percent level. The 
estimated correlations are similar to the results from the correlation matrix in Table 2. Again, 
Brazil is the most important country in the sample and none of its correlations with other 
countries is below 0.5.  
To further our analysis, we include the sovereign CDS spreads of the five countries 
into the VAR model. In order to select the precise lag terms for the VAR model, we provide 
the criteria values for model fitness. Table 4 shows that, irrespective of the number of lags 
selected, all criterion values have no big difference. Therefore, VAR (2) and VAR (3) models 
have the lowest AIC and SBC, so due to parsimony purposes, we select two lags in our VAR 
model.  
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Table 3: Binary VAR with DCC GARCH 
  BRA&VEN BRA&MEX BRA&PAN BRA&ECU MEX&PAN 
Correlation 
0.6659 0.7988 0.6953 0.5226 0.6941 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
λ1 
0.0431 0.0333 0.0540 0.0786 0.0518 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
λ2 
0.9382 0.9557 0.9294 0.9039 0.9243 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
  MEX&VEN MEX&ECU PAN&ECU PAN&VEN ECU&VEN 
Correlation 
0.5966 0.4233 0.3811 0.5330 0.5303 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
λ1 
0.0402 0.1090 0.0780 0.0413 0.0591 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
λ2 
0.9293 0.8521 0.9004 0.9323 0.9281 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Binary correlation between each country and coefficient for DCC GARCH 
estimation. The numbers in the parenthesis are p-values. 
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Table 4: Information Criteria 
Lag AIC SBC HQC AICC 
p=1 -37.7163 -37.7518 -37.7393 -37.7518 
p=2 -37.7544 -37.6833 -37.7294 -37.7543 
p=3 -37.7502 -37.6436 -37.7126 -37.75 
p=4 -37.6084 -37.7506 -37.7005 -37.7504 
p=5 -37.7498 -37.572 -37.6872 -37.7495 
 
 
4.1.2 Multivariate  VAR Model with DCC GARCH 
Table 5 Panel A provides the detailed results for the estimated correlation matrix and 
estimated coefficients for λ1 and λ2. The results are consistent with the binary DCC GARCH 
model. Again, all the correlations of Brazil with other countries are higher than 0.5, with the 
exception of its correlation with Ecuador which drops to 0.43. Interestingly, the correlations 
between Ecuador and other countries decrease dramatically by roughly 10 - 15 percent, 
compared with the binary results. Similarly λ1 and λ2 are highly significant at the 1 percent 
level, which indicates the strong persistence of the residuals even in the multivariate format. 
Table 5 Panel B provides the estimated parameters in the VAR model. The numbers 
in the parenthesis are p-values. Surprisingly, Panama seems to be the most important 
country in our sample; changes in CDS for the lag one and lag two periods are significant at 
the 1 percent level and all estimated coefficients are negative. Decreasing sovereign CDS 
spreads in Panama lead increasing sovereign CDS spreads in other countries in our sample. 
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Table 5: Multivariate VAR Fitted with DCC GARCH 
Panel A: DCC GARCH Correlation 
  ΔCDSBrazil ΔCDSVenezuela ΔCDSMexico ΔCDSPanama ΔCDSEcuador 
ΔCDSBrazil 
1.0000 0.6667 0.7912 0.7046 0.4286 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
ΔCDSVenezuela 
0.6667 1.0000 0.5926 0.5140 0.4093 
(<.0001) 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
ΔCDSMexico 
0.7912 0.5926 1.0000 0.7114 0.3796 
(<.0001) (<.0001) 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) 
ΔCDSPanama 
0.7046 0.5140 0.7114 1.0000 0.3427 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 
(<.0001) 
ΔCDSEcuador 
0.4286 0.4093 0.3796 0.3427 1.0000 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)   
  λ1 
0.0276 
λ2 
0.9615   
(<.0001) (<.0001)   
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Table 5 PANEL B: DCC GARCH Coefficient Estimation 
  ΔBRAt-1 ΔVENt-1 ΔMEXt-1 ΔPANt-1 ΔECUt-1 ΔBRAt-2 ΔVENt-2 ΔMEXt-2 ΔPANt-2 ΔECUt-2 
ΔBRA 
0.0974*** -0.0006 0.0372** -0.0837*** -0.0158 0.0164 -0.0025 0.0522** -0.0632*** -0.0121 
[<.0001] [0.974] [0.037] [<.0001] [0.189] [0.469] [0.882] [0.004] [<.0001] [0.323] 
ΔVEN 
-0.0061 0.0885*** 0.0354** -0.0244 0.0012 0.0039 0.0033 0.0601*** -0.0691*** -0.0087 
[0.760] [<.0001] [0.027] [0.115] [0.914] [0.843] [0.858] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.441] 
ΔMEX 
0.1117*** -0.0149 0.0327 -0.0923*** -0.0136 0.0486** 0.0010 0.0320 -0.0988*** -0.0076 
[<.0001] [0.453] [0.140] [<.0001] [0.365] [0.052] [0.960] [0.151] [<.0001] [0.612] 
ΔPAN 
0.0859*** 0.0134 0.0607*** -0.0499** -0.0147 0.0066 -0.0081 0.0732*** -0.0710*** -0.0134 
[<.0001] [0.440] [0.001] [0.011] [0.218] [0.755] [0.642] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.264] 
ΔECU 
0.0760*** -0.0905*** 0.1267*** -0.0837*** -0.0279 -0.0393* -0.0311 0.1512*** -0.1220*** 0.0389** 
[0.001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.198] [0.084] [0.126] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.076] 
Notes: Table 5 Panel B provides the estimated parameters in the VAR model. The numbers in the parenthesis are p-values.
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For Mexico, the change in the sovereign CDS spread for lags one and two periods 
are significant for all other countries at the 5 percent level or higher except for itself. The 
coefficients are all positive which suggests that increasing sovereign CDS spreads in Mexico 
may lead to increasing sovereign CDS spreads in other countries. Finally, a lag one period 
change in the sovereign CDS spread of Brazil positively affects the change in sovereign CDS 
spreads in other countries except Venezuela. The lag two period change in the sovereign 
CDS spreads of Brazil is not significant in any country. 
 
 
4.2 Alternative and Robustness Tests 
To further exploit the asymmetric relationship of volatility and confirm the 
persistency of the variance of the residuals, we employ an OLS model following Daigler et 
al. (2014) expressed as follows. 
                                                                
                                                                            (2) 
        |     |                                                    
                                                                 (3)  
        |     |                                                    
                                                     (4)            
 
Here, σt stands for the volatility of sovereign CDS spreads, and rt represents the change in 
sovereign CDS spreads in each country, included in each equation. We include the S&P 500 
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implied volatility indexes in equation (3) and control for the local stock market return in 
equation (4). We calculate a rolling standard deviation for the change in sovereign CDS 
spreads in each country based on a 25-day rolling window as representative of volatility. We 
also include the lag terms for volatility and change in sovereign CDS spreads in each model. 
We then run these three equations for each country to investigate and confirm the 
persistence of the variance of changes in sovereign CDS spreads, as well as the relationship 
to local stock market returns and the U.S. VIX index. Table 6 reports detailed estimated 
parameters for each model and p-values in parenthesis. 
The models in Table 6 confirm the persistence of the variance of the change in 
sovereign CDS spreads in all countries as is evident from the AR process for each model 
used in the 5 countries. For Brazil, Ecuador and Mexico, the volatility in the lag one (three) 
period is positively (negatively) significant at the 1 percent level and the contemporaneous 
change in CDS is also positively significant at the 1 percent level. There is possibly a mean 
reversion effect for the change in sovereign CDS spreads of these countries since the lag (-1) 
and lag (-3) terms seem to be negatively correlated. For Venezuela the lag one period 
volatility is positively significant at the 1 percent level and lag two periods volatility is 
negatively significant at the 10 percent level. Its volatility is not that persistent after three lags 
unlike the volatility of the aforementioned three countries. The volatility of Panama is 
persistent since all three lags are significant and the volatilities of lags two and three periods 
are negative, suggesting a possible mean reversion trend. We conclude at this point that the 
volatility of changes in sovereign CDS spreads is persistent in all countries and the 
contemporaneous change in sovereign CDS spreads positively affects the change in 
volatility. Moreover the local stock market return and VIX have no impact on the change in 
volatility of sovereign CDS spreads in any model.  
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Table 6: OLS Regression With VIX and Stock Market Return in Each Country 
COUNTRY Δrt Δrt-1 Δrt-2 Δrt-3 Δσt-1 Δσt-2 Δσt-3 ΔStock ΔVIXi Δ|rt| R
2 
Adj. 
R2 
Brazil 
-0.0016 -0.0002 0.0018 0.0018 1.1390*** -0.0492 -0.0918***       0.9970 0.9970 
[0.1491] [0.8532] [0.2825] [0.2274] [<.0001] [0.2012] [0.0004] 
     
 
-0.0005 0.0015 0.0015 1.1311*** -0.0459 -0.0914*** 0.0019 
 
0.0061 0.9971 0.9970 
 
[0.6491] [0.3680] [0.3463] [<.0001] [0.2338] [0.0004] [0.2424] 
 
[3.78] 
  
 
0.0001 0.0014 0.0014 1.1308*** -0.0453 -0.0918*** 0.0013 -0.0004 0.0062*** 0.9971 0.9970 
  [0.6293] [0.3855] [0.3541] [<.0001] [0.2390] [0.0004] [0.4193] [0.4191] [0.0001]     
Venezuala 
0.0003 -0.0004 0.0009 0.0011 1.2062*** -0.1965* -0.0127       0.9955 0.9954 
[0.8349] [0.7220] [0.6098] [0.4982] [<.0001] [0.0752] [0.6053] 
     
 
-0.0004 0.0006 0.0010 1.2014*** -0.1951* -0.0134 0.0024* 
 
0.0059*** 0.9955 0.9955 
 
[0.7113] [0.7073] [0.5383] [<.0001] [0.0791] [0.5815] [0.0956] 
 
[0.0031] 
  
 
-0.0004 0.0006 0.0010 1.2016*** -0.1953* -0.0133 0.0023 -0.0002 0.0060*** 0.9955 0.9955 
  [0.7032] [0.7168] [0.5558] [<.0001] [0.0789] [0.5841] [0.1110] [0.6671] [0.0032]     
Mexico 
-0.0001 -0.0018 0.0003 0.0037*** 1.1108*** -0.0143 -0.0981***       0.9974 0.9974 
[0.8894] [0.1847] [0.8458] [0.0027] [<.0001] [0.6673] [<.0001] 
     
 
-0.0019 0.0000 0.0036*** 1.1033*** -0.0132 -0.0961*** 0.0024 
 
0.0059*** 0.9974 0.9974 
 
[0.1640] 0.9933 [0.0044] [<.0001] [0.6957] [<.0001] [0.2690] 
 
[<.0001] 
  
 
-0.0019 0.0000 0.0036*** 1.1033*** -0.0131 -0.0962*** 0.0017 -0.0003 0.0060*** 0.9974 0.9974 
  [0.1604] [0.9886] [0.0047] [<.0001] [0.6973] [<.0001] [0.4491] [0.5133] [<.0001]     
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COUNTRY Δrt Δrt-1 Δrt-2 Δrt-3 Δσt-1 Δσt-2 Δσt-3 ΔStock ΔVIXi Δ|rt| R
2 
Adj. 
R2 
Panama 
-0.0002 0.0018* 0.0017 0.0031*** 1.1074*** -0.0629** -0.0461**       0.9972 0.9972 
[0.8838] [0.0915] [0.1508] [0.0059] [<.0001] [0.0362] [0.0127] 
     
 
0.0018 0.0015 0.0031*** 1.1010*** -0.0585* -0.0493*** 0.0033 
 
0.0070*** 0.9973 0.9973 
 
[0.1057] [0.2089] [0.0050] [<.0001] [0.0502] [0.0075] [0.5085] 
 
[<.0001] 
  
 
0.0018 0.0014 0.0030*** 1.1016*** -0.0584* -0.0502*** 0.0026 -0.0009* 0.0073*** 0.9973 0.9973 
  [0.1077] [0.2529] [0.0061] [<.0001] [0.0501] [0.0064] [0.6115] [0.0778] [<.0001]     
Ecuador 
0.0002 -0.0026 0.0032 0.0026 1.0196*** -0.0192 -0.0115* 
   
0.9779 0.9779 
[0.9446] [0.1782] [0.1848] [0.1647] [<.0001] [0.2884] [0.0832] 
     
 
-0.0034 0.0028 0.0025 1.0160*** -0.0176 -0.0141* -0.0027 
 
0.0104* 0.9780 0.9780 
 
[0.1106] [0.2366] [0.1804] [<.0001] [0.3386] [0.0678] [0.1156] 
 
[0.0770] 
  
 
-0.0035 0.0027 0.0024 1.0163*** -0.0178 -0.0143* -0.0027 -0.0009 0.0105* 0.9780 0.9780 
  [0.1027] [0.2505] [0.2023] [<.0001] [0.3350] [0.0641] [0.1191] [0.2814] [0.0754]     
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4.3 Panel techniques: Relation of Sovereign CDSs to Terms of Trade and Global Factors 
 
4.3.1 Variables 
There is extensive evidence in the literature that shocks to U.S. equity and fixed income 
markets are transmitted globally. In this section, we expand our analysis to 19 countries which we 
simultaneously analyze in a panel regression format with 10 specifications. We explore terms of 
trade, proxied by country-specific commodity price indexes, the components of which are major 
commodities traded in world markets. Additionally, we update our measure of volatility from VIX to 
a measure of VIX volatility risk premium, which captures the risk premium embedded in the VIX 
index. In lieu of the local stock indexes, we replace this variable with the U.S. stock market return, in 
our consideration of global financial factors as sources of commonality in sovereign credit risk. In 
addition to global factors, we include our country-specific terms of trade variable in the analysis.  
 
Country-specific variables: Following Hilscher and Noshbusch (2010), we construct our monthly 
country-specific commodity price index using data on country commodity shares of export from 
COMTRADE and commodity prices from World Bank commodity data. The indexes we construct 
are made up of major commodities that trade on world markets. Since terms of trade may be 
affected by similar factors that influence a country‟s capacity to repay its external debt, the country-
specific commodity price indexes control for any potential endogeneity of terms of trade. We select 
12 commodities to make up out index including, oil, coffee, textiles, copper, cotton, cocoa, meat, 
bananas, leather, gold, gas and silver. We calculate the commodity price change as the weighted 
average price change of the 12 commodity price series, weighted by the annual commodity 
percentage of export value for a sovereign. The time-varying commodity weight varies by country. 
We also include a variable for the volatility in the country-specific commodity price indexes. 
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Global Financial Factors: For the U.S. stock market return variable, we include the excess 
return on all CRSP firms incorporated in the US and listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. 
The literature provides evidence that the difference between implied and realized (historical) 
volatility may proxy the volatility premium for holding an option (Mark Britten-Jones and Anthony 
Neuberger, 2000; Pan 2002, etc.). Using daily returns of the S&P 500 index, a 20-day rolling volatility 
of the returns is calculated for realized volatility. The month-end value of the realized volatility 
estimator is subtracted from the corresponding same-day CBOE volatility index (VIX) to obtain our 
proxy for the volatility risk premium embedded in the VIX index. The volatility risk premium proxy 
is the difference between the two time series. Additionally, we incorporate the change in the spread 
between the 10-year return on U.S. BB-rated corporate bonds and the 6-month U.S. Treasury bill 
rate, viewed as a measure of both U.S. macroeconomic and global financial market developments, to 
explore the effect on changes in sovereign CDS spreads.  
 
Lags and dummy variables: we include lagged variables for the monthly changes in sovereign 
CDS spreads and commodity price index returns, to control for variation that may be caused by 
previous changes in these variables. Using a dummy variable, we also control for the changes in 
sovereign CDS spreads during the years of the financial crisis, from 2007 to 2009.  
 
Regional and Country group dummy variables: Additionally, using the spreads of sovereigns within 
particular groups, we construct dummy variables as proxies for regional and external economic 
factors. We identify the BRICS and Latin America country groups and calculate the average 
sovereign CDS spreads and monthly changes in the spreads. We also regress the changes in 
sovereign CDS spreads on these country group dummy variables.  
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4.3.2 Panel Regressions 
For the 19 countries, in successive model specifications, we regress the monthly change in 
sovereign CDS spreads on changes in terms of trade (country-specific commodity price index), U.S. 
stock market excess return, U.S. BB corporate bond index spread, volatility risk premium, volatility 
of commodity price index, lags of changes in sovereign CDS spreads, lags of changes in commodity 
price index, dummy variables for the financial crisis, BRICS and Latin America countries as well as 
interaction variables, and country fixed effects to control for these effects. Table 7 reports the t-
statistics and adjusted R2 of our 9 model regressions. 
 
                                                                                
                                        t             (5) 
  
 
Starting with our country factor variable of interest, the country-specific commodity price 
index, Table 7 suggests that terms of trade affects the sovereign‟s credit risk. We observe striking 
results for changes in country-specific commodity price indexes. This variable is significant at the 
1% level in 8 of our model specifications, even after we control for U.S. stock market return, U.S. 
BB corporate bond return and volatility risk premium. The sign of the coefficient for the country-
specific commodity price index is uniformly negative across all specifications, indicating that good 
news for a sovereign‟s terms of trade is also favorable for its sovereign credit risk, as sovereign CDS 
spreads decrease. Our results suggest that narrowing CDS spreads may result from increasing 
country terms of trade. Hilscher and Nosbusch‟s (2010) results on terms of trade which use 
sovereign bond yields to proxy for sovereign credit risk are similar to ours, although we proxy for 
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sovereign credit risk with sovereign CDS spreads. This, to our knowledge, is a new result providing 
further evidence on sovereign CDS premiums. 
Turning to the global financial factors, we observe consistent results to the literature on the 
sources of commonality in sovereign credit risk. The U.S. stock market return is significant in all 
specifications in explaining variation in sovereign credit risk. It is consistently negative in sign. We 
interpret the negative significant coefficients as implying that improving U.S. market conditions are 
associated with good news for sovereign CDS spreads.  Likewise, sovereign CDS spreads are 
significantly related to the volatility risk premium embedded in the VIX index. The volatility risk 
premium has negative coefficients and is significant at the 1 percent level in all specifications. Our 
results are consistent with the view that global time-varying risk premiums are important in 
explaining sovereign credit risk. This is consistent with the view that global factors are responsible 
for our significant DCC GARCH correlations of the comovements of sovereign CDS spreads. Our 
significant results on VIX are consistent with previous findings (including, Schaefer and Strebulaev 
(2008) and Pan and Singleton (2008), and support the view that VIX is an indicator of investor 
sentiment and appetite for global event risk. Our U.S. BB corporate bond index spread variable, 
though significant at the 5 percent level in model 3, pales in significance when compared to the 
other global financial factors. Overall, our result on the influence of terms of trade on sovereign 
CDS spreads is particularly important, given that we obtain this result after controlling for global 
financial factors considered by the literature to be significant in explaining changes in sovereign CDS 
spreads. 
The lagged variables for changes in sovereign CDS spreads (lags -1, -2) and changes in the 
country-specific commodity price index (lag -1) are also significant explanatory variables. The results 
for the lagged changes in CDS spreads are consistent with our earlier results from the DCC 
GARCH model, in that the coefficients of the lags (-1, - 2) changes are generally negative and 
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positive, respectively. The coefficient of the financial crisis is significant at the 10 percent level, 
though its explanatory power is not as strong as our constructed commodity price index terms of 
trade measure, U.S. equity return and BB corporate bond index spread. Overall, our results are not 
explained by our BRICS and Latin America groupings of countries, as these dummy variables are 
not significant. The interaction variable for Latin America and the changes in country-specific 
commodity price index is significant at the 5 percent level, which is weaker than the strong results 
for the U.S. equity returns and volatility risk premium global factors.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES Model[1] Model[2] Model[3] Model[4] Model[5] Model[6] Model[7] Model[8] Model[9]
∆tot -0.3411***-0.2344***-0.2275***-0.1430***-0.1537***-0.1386***-0.1490***-0.1415*** -0.0809
(-11.09) (-8.48) (-8.18) (-5.21) (-5.41) (-4.91) (-5.26) (-3.86) (-1.56)
US_stkt -1.6134***-1.5913***-1.3442***-1.3549***-1.3509***-1.3671***-1.3603***-1.3586***
(-24.89) (-24.25) (-20.47) (-20.47) (-20.28) (-20.47) (-20.26) (-20.22)
BBt 0.2350** 0.1366 0.1048 0.0160 0.0414 -0.0208 -0.0239
(2.07) (1.25) (0.93) (0.14) (0.36) (-0.17) (-0.20)
VIX_rp -0.7392***-0.7327***-0.6649***-0.6642***-0.6509***-0.6439***
(-13.68) (-13.48) (-12.01) (-12.03) (-11.62) (-11.49)
σtot 0.2523 0.3269 0.2641 0.1086 0.0693
(0.82) (1.05) (0.84) (0.33) (0.21)
lag -1 (∆rt-1) 0.1557*** 0.1680*** 0.1663*** 0.1652***
(8.45) (9.02) (8.91) (8.85)
lag -2 (∆rt-2) -0.0567***-0.0575***-0.0584***-0.0609***
(-3.14) (-3.13) (-3.18) (-3.30)
lag -1 (∆tott-1) 0.1093*** 0.1097*** 0.1099***
(3.84) (3.85) (3.86)
lag -2 (∆tott-2) -0.0435 -0.0417 -0.0429
(-1.55) (-1.48) (-1.52)
Financial crisis dummy 0.0134* 0.0137**
(1.95) (1.99)
Financial crisis variable*Price -0.0195 -0.0445
(-0.35) (-0.76)
BRICS countries dummy -0.0060
(-0.91)
BRICS variable*Price -0.0199
(-0.31)
LATAM dummy variable -0.0042
(-0.71)
LATAM*Price -0.1484**
(-2.44)
Constant 0.0011 0.0088*** -0.0048 0.0275*** 0.0259*** 0.0277*** 0.0266*** 0.0278*** 0.0314***
(0.34) (2.99) (-0.67) (3.78) (3.31) (3.49) (3.34) (3.46) (3.61)
Observations 2,308 2,308 2,308 2,308 2,298 2,261 2,261 2,261 2,261
Adj. R-squared 0.0503 0.251 0.252 0.308 0.309 0.333 0.337 0.337 0.339
Table 7: Sovereign risk, terms of trade and global factors
Monthly changes in CDS spreads are regressed on monthly changes in country commodity price indexes (∆tot) instrumenting for terms of 
trade, US Stock Market excess return (US_stk), US BB corporate bond spread (BB),  VIX volatility risk premium (VIX_rp); volatility of 
commodity price index (σ_tot); lag changes in CDS spreads (lag -1 (∆r t-1) and lag -2 (∆r t-2)); lag changes in commodity price indexes (lag -
1 (∆tot t-1) and lag -2 (∆tot t-2)); dummy variables for the financial crisis, BRICS countries, LATAM countries; interaction variables: 
BRICS*Price, LATAM * price; models include country fixed effects. We report the t-statistics and adjusted R 2 of the regressions.
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5. CONCLUSION 
We investigate the co-movement of sovereign CDS spreads in several countries by 
employing a second order VAR model fitted with a DCC GARCH process as proposed by Engle 
(2002). In addition to finding that the country pairwise correlations are generally significant, we find 
consistent results across the binary and multivariate DCC GARCH models, suggesting commonality 
in the sources of variation of sovereign CDS spreads. Further, our results suggest that local stock 
returns and the U.S. VIX index are not important sources of variation of sovereign CDS spreads, 
though we obtain significant results when we isolate the volatility risk premium embedded in the 
VIX index. Exploring the variance of residuals from the VAR model, we find that they are persistent 
over time. Our results confirm that volatility is persistent in four out of five Latin American 
countries in our initial sample. 
Expanding the sample size to 19 countries, we exploit panel regressions to study the sources 
of the strong commonality, exploring global financial factors and introducing terms of trade as a 
significant variable that explains changes in sovereign CDS spreads. Due to terms of trade 
endogeneity concerns, we construct 19 country-specific commodity price indexes to instrument for 
country terms of trade. Our novel results indicate that the country-specific commodity price indexes 
have a statistically and economically significant effect on changes in sovereign CDS spreads, even 
after controlling for global factors. In addition to this new evidence on sovereign CDS markets and 
terms of trade, we validate previous results on global financial factors, confirming that they are 
significant sources of variability in sovereign credit risk, with strongest results for U.S. stock market 
returns and the volatility risk premium embedded in VIX factors. Our results apply broadly to 
investors, financial institutions and policy makers. 
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Essay Two 
 
Differential Stock Market Returns and Corporate Credit Risk of Listed Firms 
 
Uche Isiugo 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This essay examines the information transfer effect of shocks to sovereign credit risk as captured in 
the credit default swaps (CDS) and stock market returns of cross-listed and local stock exchange 
listed firms. Based on changes in sovereign credit ratings and outlooks, we find that widening CDS 
spreads of firms imply that negative credit events dominate, whereas tightening spreads indicate 
positive events. Grouping firms into companies with cross-listings and those without, we compare 
the spillover effects and find strong evidence of contagion across equity and CDS markets in both 
company groupings. Our findings suggest that the sensitivity of corporate CDS prices to sovereign 
credit events is larger for non-cross-listed firms. Possible reasons for this finding could in fact be 
due to cross-listed firms‟ better access to external capital and less degree of asymmetric information, 
relative to non-cross-listed peers with lower level of investor recognition. Our results provide new 
evidence relevant to investors and financial institutions in determining sovereign credit risk germane 
to corporate financial risk, for the construction of debt and equity portfolios, and hedging 
considerations in today‟s dynamic environment. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Understanding the impact of sovereign debt risk on domestic firms is important. This 
phenomenon, sometimes referred to as transfer risk, is represented by a spillover from sovereign to 
corporate credit risk. In more extreme cases, the debt encumbrance of a sovereign in financial 
distress may plausibly be shifted onto the private sector through some channels, including changes 
in available bank financing, decline in government aid or subsidy programs, heightened taxation. 
Sovereign credit events have been found to cause contagion across financial markets, therefore it is 
crucial to understand the dynamics of sovereign risk and its effects on the corporate credit risk and 
equity returns of domiciled firms.  
Cross-listed firms have a proclivity to alter their access to foreign equity and debt markets. 
Holton et al. (2014), in examining the Euro credit crisis, show that the sovereign crisis spilled over 
into the real economy through tighter credit conditions, associated with an increase in loan 
rejections and interest rates for SMEs. Attempts to solve financing deficits may be employed by 
firms by making a cross-listing decision. Sovereign credit risk affects firms through a number of 
channels. First, during a sovereign default, both cross-listed and non cross-listed firms may have 
significant exposure to potential capital and currency controls that sovereigns sometimes impose in a 
crisis. Second, sovereign credit ratings have important implications on the ratings of companies 
domiciled within the country. Ratings agencies often impose a sovereign credit rating ceiling on the 
credit rating of companies. While a few companies are able to achieve a credit rating higher than that 
of the sovereign, there is a limit on how much a company‟s rating can exceed the sovereign‟s. Third, 
a downgrade or an upgrade of sovereign debt may lead to changes in the capital requirements of 
domestic financial institutions, which have implications on the capital and bank credit available to 
local firms, irrespective of their cross-listings or lack thereof. Changes in sovereign credit risk have 
effects on risk-weighted bank capital, which in turn can affect the financing of firms, as banks may 
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hold additional capital against increasingly risky sovereign debt. Fitch Ratings reports a EUR 2.3 
trillion exposure of EU banks to sovereign risk at end-June 2015, two-thirds of which is weighted in 
the banks' domestic sovereigns.  Sovereign bonds are usually deemed safe securities and play a big 
role in providing bank liquidity.  
Exploiting a daily data set consisting of dollar denominated CDSs linked to corporate 
reference obligors, we examine the reaction of corporate CDS spreads to sovereign credit rating 
changes and the spillover effects of these events into credit and equity markets. Specifcally, we seek 
to address the following questions: 
 
1. Do sovereign credit events significantly impact corporate credit risk? Is there significant 
reaction in the corporate CDSs and stock prices of domiciled firms? Do the sovereign credit 
rating announcements contain relevant new information for firms?  
2. Compared to non-cross-listed firms, do cross-listed firms have a signifcantly differential 
reaction to sovereign credit events. Are cross-listed firms‟ CDS reactions more sensitive to 
changes in sovereign credit ratings? 
3. Do positive (negative) sovereign credit events lead to a relatively lesser (greater) 
improvement in the CDS spreads of cross-listed firms, compared to the CDS spreads of 
non-cross-listed firms. Are non-cross-listed firms poised to gain more following an 
improved sovereign credit rating?  
4. Are sovereign credit events anticipated in the corporate CDS market? 
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Following the above questions, our first hypothesis is: 
H1: Sovereign credit events are associated with corporate credit risk. 
Cross-listed corporations are likely able to more flexibly address gaps in financing and may 
enjoy improved access to external capital, such that their exposure to changes in sovereign credit 
worthiness or general credit conditions may be limited, leading to our second hypothesis:  
H2: Cross-listed firms, compared to firms listed only on local-exchanges, have a differential reaction 
sovereign credit events. 
Non-cross-listed firms, compared to cross-listed firms usually have a more limited access to 
raise capital in foreign markets. Hence, if firms generally suffer from more constrained access to 
foreign capital during negative credit events or downturns, non-cross-listed firms may experience a 
worse deterioration in financing. Our third hypothesis follows: 
H3: Following negative sovereign credit events, CDS spreads of non-cross-listed firms are expected 
to rise to a greater degree than that of cross-listed firms 
One reason for this is due to the limited ability of non-cross-listed firms to raise capital in foreign 
markets. We also investigate the reaction of firms to positive sovereign events 
If changes in sovereign credit events reflect only publicly available information and are 
relevant to corporate risk, corporate CDS spread reactions should be anticipatory, to reflect 
impending sovereign credit announcements. This forms the basis of the following hypotheses. 
H4: Corporate CDS spreads do not generally anticipate negative sovereign events 
H5: Corporate CDS spreads do not generally anticipate positive sovereign events 
Firms that decide to cross-list are expected to have growth opportunities and solve a 
financing deficit. Relative to firms that are listed only on local exchanges, cross-listed firms have 
improved access to external capital and may solve financing deficit problems more flexibly. We 
therefore expect a differential reaction of cross-listed firms to shocks to domestic capital supply that 
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might arise following significant sovereign credit events. To capture this, we examine the behavior 
of corporate CDSs and stock returns in assimilating new sovereign credit information from 
sovereign credit rating and outlook announcements made by Moody‟s Investors Service . By means 
of the reaction of corporate CDS spreads, we explore the relationship between changes in sovereign 
credit ratings and corporate credit risk. We also examine the association between sovereign credit 
ratings and the equity returns of domiciled firms. Using our results from the reactions of cross-listed 
firms and companies listed only on local exchanges, we are able to make inferences on the benefits 
and costs of cross-listing by comparing both groups of firms.  
Major sovereign credit events commonly affect several companies in the economy, so it is 
important to understand how cross-listed firms react relative to their non-cross-listed peers. One of 
the justifications for cross-listing is to lower the cost of capital by overcoming investment barriers 
that segment capital markets (Doidge et al., 2009). We expect that an increase in sovereign risk may 
lead to greater weakening of corporate credit risk among non-cross-listed firms, due to their limited 
access to foreign capital sources. We expect a similar effect as seen across companies that rely on 
explicit and implicit government guarantees during episodes of heightened sovereign risk. As our 
main hypothesis, we therefore conjecture that changes in sovereign credit risk are associated with 
significantly differenct changes in corporate credit risk for local-exchange firms relative to cross-
listed firms.  
 
 
2. RELEVANT LITERATURE 
There has been increased interest in research investigating the link between sovereign and 
corporate credit. This follows a preponderance of sovereign credit risk in developed economies, 
particularly in the Eurozone. Sovereign credit ratings can affect firms‟ investment and cost of debt. 
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Arteta and Hale (2006) find that sovereign debt crises are systematically associated with a decline in 
foreign credit issued by domestic private firms. This potentially leads to crowding out in domestic 
credit markets and more capital-constrained firms. Almeida, et al. (2014) find that firms reduce their 
investment and reliance on credit markets due to rising cost of debt capital following a sovereign 
rating downgrade. In the event that spillovers to corporate CDS markets depend on firm 
characteristics such as government aid, concentration of domestic sales, degree of reliance on bank 
financing (Bedendo and Colla (2015), we argue that there may in fact be differential spillover effects 
to cross-listed firms. Pagano, et al. (2002) document that cross-listed firms expand their foreign sales 
after listing abroad. Acharya, et al. (2014) model a loop between sovereign and bank credit risk and 
show that a distressed financial sector induces government bailouts, whose cost increases sovereign 
credit risk. This weakens the financial sector, and conceivably, diminishes the available credit to 
firms by eroding the value of government guarantees and bond holdings. There are direct costs 
related to the decline in sovereign creditworthiness and the resultant level of production in the 
economy. A deterioration of credit risk can impede future economic growth, and for that reason, 
make subsequent debt crises more probable. 
Research also explores the transfer of information by investigating the reaction of CDS 
spreads to important events. Hull, Predescu, and White (2004), Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2004), 
Norden and Weber (2004), and Blanco et al. (2005) find that CDS prices are a source of valuable 
information on firms. Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) examine the response of sovereign CDS 
markets to sovereign credit announcements, observing cross-country spillovers across different 
sovereign CDSs, found to be transmitted via common creditor and competition in trade markets. 
They argue that positive rating announcements have an immediate impact on sovereign CDS 
markets, while negative rating announcements have no impact. Jorion and Zhang (2007) examine 
the intra-industry information transfer effect of credit events, as captured in the corporate CDS and 
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stock markets and find evidence of contagion effects for Chapter 11 bankruptcies. Movements in 
firm‟s CDS spreads are often negatively related to changes in stock prices because some credit 
events imply differing movements across these markets. Acharya and Johnson (2007) argue that 
there is an information flow from the CDS markets to equity markets and that this flow is 
permanent and more significant for entities with a greater number of bank relationships.  
There has been much debate in the literature regarding the relative benefits of cross-listing. 
According to the bonding theory, one benefit of a U.S. cross-listing is that firms can finance growth 
opportunities on better terms (Coffee (1999) and Stulz ( 1999). Some of the emphasized benefits 
include, the increase in liquidity of cross-listed foreign shares, the prospect of raising lower cost 
capital in a more efficient market, an enlarged shareholder base to diversify financial risk, and 
increased prestige and investors‟ recognition of cross-listing firms. Siegel (2005) suggests that 
reputational bonding could occur as the result of giving capital to a firm, observing the firm reveal 
its true type during a downturn, and then allocating a number of more economically significant 
rewards and punishments based on revelations. This line of research suggests that the market 
strongly rewards cross-listed firms for not being accused of any large-scale expropriation during an 
economic downturn.  
Similar to our research, some studies have explored market announcement reactions of firms 
in the capital markets, deemed economic costs or benefits, and ascribed the resultant reactions to 
improved information flows across firms after cross-listing. Relative to differences in information, 
Ashcraft and Santos (2009) find economically significant adverse effects to the cost of debt of risky 
and informationally-opaque firms, stemming from the availability of CDS trading. This finding on 
firms with higher asymmetric information is different from the results on the average borrower. Our 
analysis is in the spirit of studies addressing the costs vs. benefits and economic impacts of cross-
listings. It is expected that an increase in sovereign risk may lead to a differential reaction of 
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corporate credit risk among firms that are cross-listed. According to, Sarkissian and Schill (2009), 
firms decide to cross-list in order to surmount capital and informational barriers as well as gains to 
market characteristics. In studying the economic impact of a cross-listing, they find a prelisting 
runup and a postlisting decline and discover that the average cost of capital gains from cross-listing 
are statistically zero. Bailey, et al. (2006) study the implications of increased disclosure faced by 
cross-listed non U.S. firms and find that absolute return and volume reactions to earnings 
announcements typically increase significantly after cross-listing. 
According to surveys of managers, capital market access is a primary motivation for foreign 
listings (Karolyi, 2012). This advantage is likely to be greatest for those firms that are financially 
constrained. Lins et al. (2005) shows that foreign firms that list in the U.S. become less credit-
constrained due to cross-listing, as firms‟ investments depend less on their cash flows subsequent to 
the U.S. listing. Ndubizu (2007) finds that cash flows peak in years -1 and 0 of the cross-listing and 
fall significantly in subsequent years. Fresard and Salva (2010) show that the value investors attach to 
excess cash reserves is substantially larger for foreign firms listed on US exchanges and over-the-
counter than for their domestic peers. They find that investors place higher value on the excess cash 
reserves of foreign firms listed on US exchanges and over-the-counter, due to US legal rules and 
disclosure requirements, greater informal monitoring and constraints on insiders' inefficient 
allocation of corporate cash. Doidge, et al. (2010) find that firms that subsequently delist from the 
United States financial markets do so because they do not foresee the need to raise funds externally. 
Edison and Warnock (2008) suggest that cross-listing of an emerging market firm on a U.S. 
exchange is an important but short-lived capital flows event. They suggest that the cross-listed stock 
is in effect a new security that U.S. investors quickly bring into their portfolios and conclude that 
most if not all of the effect of a cross-listing occurs in the month of the listing.  
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Prior to changes in sovereign credit ratings, we test whether there is anticipation in the CDS 
and the stock market returns of these two groups of firms. We expect that positive sovereign credit 
events are generally unanticipated by corporate CDS spreads. Relative to positive sovereign credit 
events, the CDS spreads of cross-listed firms are expected to narrow, though by a lower percent 
compared to that of firms that are not cross-listed. One reason for this is due to the ability of cross-
listed firms to raise capital in foreign markets. Therefore, the credit risk of cross-listed firms is more 
integrated with global capital markets.  
We investigate the reaction of firms to negative sovereign events, as we expect an association 
between the CDS spreads of both groups of firms and negative sovereign credit events. Further, 
adverse news such as a sovereign credit downgrade should have a greater impact on the volatility of 
the CDS spreads of local-exchange only firms. We expect these effects to be particularly strong in 
cases of sovereign downgrades from investment grade to speculative, and for defaults. In an efficient 
market new information is instantaneously absorbed. We utilize changes in sovereign bond ratings 
because they represent significant new information. We expect that the information transmitted 
from sovereign credit rating change events is not instantly incorporated in the corporate CDS 
spreads. We also expect differential speeds of adjustment in the CDS spreads of cross-listed firms 
and local-exchange firms. Our results suggest that new information is not instantaneously 
incorporated but that there is a steady and continuing adjustment for a significant period after the 
rating change. 
We also investigate the stock returns of cross-listed firms and local-exchange firms, to 
explore the effects of changes in sovereign credit ratings. Additionally, we  test to determine if stock 
returns anticipate sovereign credit events. Changes in sovereign credit ratings can potentially affect 
equity returns. We expect that positive sovereign credit events would be largely unanticipated by the 
stock returns. Cross-listed firms enjoy higher investor recognition, liquidity and have a higher 
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probability of being incorporated in portfolios. Positive sovereign credit events may therefore drive 
larger effects on the equity returns of cross-listed firms than stock returns of firms that are not 
cross-listed. Likewise, we investigate the reaction of firms to negative sovereign events. We expect 
that the stock returns of cross-listed firms would anticipate negative sovereign events. Furthermore, 
local-exchange only firms should experience greater volatility of stock returns than that of cross-
listed firms. We expect these effects to be particularly strong in cases of sovereign downgrades from 
investment grade to speculative, and for defaults. 
These effects are decidedly more muted in the stock market than in the corporate CDS 
market. In an efficient market, new information is instantaneously absorbed. We utilize changes in 
sovereign bond ratings because they represent significant new information. We expect that the 
information transmitted from sovereign credit rating change events is not instantly incorporated in 
the corporate CDS and stock markets. Our results suggest that this new information is not 
instantaneously incorporated but that there is a steady and continuing adjustment for a significant 
period after the rating change. However, the corporate CDS markets reflect the new information 
more rapidly than the stock market. One possible explanation for this difference might be that there 
are two distinct markets for corporate CDS and stocks. 
 
 
2.1 The CDS Market  
A credit default swap (CDS) is a contract that protects against the risk of bond default by a 
country or corporation. Buyers of CDS contracts pay the CDS premium to CDS sellers. Similar to a 
typical insurance contract, CDS buyers pay premiums over time. The premium is equal to the CDS 
spread, a percentage of the contract‟s notional value expressed in basis points. The similarity 
between CDS and insurance contracts does not hold in some important ways. CDS contracts are 
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traded, whereas insurance contracts are not traded. Additionally, buyers of CDS contracts do not 
have to own the underlying bonds in order to enter the CDS contract, while buyers of insurance 
contracts usually have to demonstrate a direct economic exposure to acquire insurance. By the end 
of 2014, CDS contracts referencing non-financial firms stood at $6 trillion, financial firms $4 trillion, 
multiple sectors $4 trillion while those referencing sovereigns stood at $2 trillion. By rating, contracts 
referencing investment grade entities equaled $10 trillion and those referencing lower-rated or 
unrated entities $7 trillion.  
 
 
2.2 Types of Cross-listed firms 
In addition to domestically listed firms, our sample contains cross-listed firms with Level I, 
II and III ADR United States programs as well as firms listed on the London Main Market. The 
cross-listing literature has demonstrated that only the Level II and III ADRs programs have a higher 
corporate governance quality (Doidge et al., 2004; Schrage & Vaaler, 2005) and benefit from 
bonding. With a level 1 ADR, a firm neither needs to register with the U.S. SEC nor does it need to 
abide by GAAP, with inherent risks. This extends the trading venue of a firm‟s securities to the U.S. 
OTC Bulletin Board or Pink Sheets trading systems, although level 1 ADRs are not traded on U.S. 
exchanges.  
Level I ADRs may be either sponsored or unsponsored. An unsponsored ADR is set up by a 
depositary bank without conferring with the firm, while a sponsored ADR is set up by the listing 
firm in conjunction with a depositary bank.  Level 2 and Level 3 sponsored ADRs must meet certain 
more stringent requirements, usually associated with higher corporate governance standards. They 
must register with the SEC, and financial statements must be reconciled to GAAP or IFRS. For a 
primary offering or raising capital, a level III sponsorship is required. Only level 2 and 3 ADRs can 
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be listed on the NYSE, the American Stock Exchange, or NASDAQ.  Regulation S and Rule 144A 
are sections of the US Securities Act of governing an transactions of foreign stocks and other 
securities. Historically, securities of a non-US company were only to be offered for sale within the 
United States only after registration of those securities with the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). An approval of an exemption from registering foreign securities can be 
conferred through Rule 144A, thus allowing a restricted offering of those foreign securities to 
Qualified Institutional Buyers.  A restricted offering into the States is often combined with an 
unrestricted placement of securities offshore (i.e. outside of the US) under the provisions of 
Regulation S. firms are able to access foreign capital markets via these SEC provisions. Thus, we 
expect a differential reaction to sovereign credit events associated with the type of cross-listing 
across various firms.  
 
 
3. SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
This essay uses CDS spreads obtained from Bloomberg. The dataset which we have access 
to provides daily quotes on CDS spreads for over 400 obligors from August 2006 to January 2016. 
Quotes are collected from a large sample of banks and aggregated into a composite number, 
ensuring reasonably continuous and accurate price quotations. We use only the 5-year spreads 
because these contracts are the most liquid and constitute over 85% of the entire CDS market. To 
maintain uniformity in contracts, we only keep CDS quotations for senior unsecured debt. This 
sample has 400 obligors and 917,668 daily observations on firms‟ CDS spreads. The 400 firms are 
domiciled in 20 countries. Information on foreign firms that have their common stock listed on a 
U.S. exchange directly or in the form of an ADR is provided by Citigroup, Bank of New York and 
JP Morgan. 
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Types of U.S. Cross-listings 
Type of 
Program 
Description 
SEC Filing required 
 
Capital 
Raising 
 
 Unsponsored 
 ADRs traded on the US OTC market, using 
existing shares. No contractual relationship 
with company. Up to four depositary banks 
can establish 
Form F-6 (filed by depositary 
bank),     12g3-2(b) exemption  No 
 Sponsored 
Level I 
 ADRs traded on the US OTC market, using 
existing shares. Company forms contractual 
relationship with single depositary bank 
 Form F-6 (filed by depositary 
bank  
and company,  
12g3-2(b) exemption 
 No 
 Sponsored 
Level II 
 ADRs listed on a recognized US exchange 
(NYSE or NASDAQ), using existing shares 
 Form F-6,     Form 20-F  No 
 Sponsored 
Level III 
 ADRs initially placed with US investors and 
listed on a recognized US exchange (NYSE or 
NASDAQ) 
 Form F-6, Form 20-F, Form F-1  Yes 
From Deutsche Bank 
 
 
Our sample of CDS spreads includes 400 obligors, though we compile over 4000 companies 
in our merged list of cross-listed foreign firms in the U.S. We drop some observations from firms 
domiciled in countries that do not experience a change in CCR, for example Canada does not 
experience a change in CCR, based on Moody‟s credit rating. From our sample of corporate CDS 
premiums, we identify foreign firms cross-listed in the U.S. and in the UK. 
We summarize basic statistics for each data set in Table I and list the number of firms in 
each country, as well as the number of U.S. and U.K. cross-listings by country. Of the 20 countries 
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in our sample, 18 countries have domiciled firms with U.S. cross-listings, while 9 countries have 
firms with U.K. cross-listings. Based on available corporate CDS data, 16 of the 20 countries are in 
Europe.  
There are 223 U.S. and 23 U.K. cross-listings. while 81 Japanese firms are cross-listed to the 
U.S. while 9 U.S. firms are cross-listed in the U.K.10 foreign firms are cross-listed in both the U.S. 
and the U.K. For companies for which both CDS return and stock return are available, we examine 
the reaction of both markets to changes in sovereign credit ratings.VWe match the changes in 
sovereign ratings to the 20 countries for which we have corporate CDS data. Summary statistics on 
the CDS spreads referencing the obligors are provided in Table 1. The top panel shows the number 
of positive and negative events by year and by country.  
Following Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010), in order to quantify credit rating events, we assign 
numerical values to Moody‟s Credit ratings and credit outlooks. For letter credit ratings, we create a 
ratings scale from -1 to 17 with the Aaa rating taking the highest value and C (Typically in default) 
the lowest. For further details, see the Appendix A. Similarly, credit outlooks take on values from -
0.5 for outlook „„Negative” to 0.5 for outlook „„Positive.” Additionally, for each sovereign, we 
construct a cumulative comprehensive credit rating (CCR) by adding the numerical values assigned 
to the letter credit rating and credit outlook of that entity. For example, on September 22nd, 2009,  
Brazil‟s outstanding U.S. dollar denominated government debt was rated Baa3/Positive. Thus, from 
September 22nd, 2009 until Brazil‟s next credit rating event on June 20th, 2011, the cumulative 
comprehensive credit rating of Brazil was 8.5.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
        Corporate CDS Spreads 
By country 
No. of 
firms 
US 
Cross 
listing 
UK 
Cross 
listing Mean  Median 
Standard 
deviation 
Austria 1 1   73.7 67.6 51.1 
Belgium 3 2   107.4 58.7 182.9 
Brazil 3 3   148.9 97.7 255.1 
Germany 24 23 2 123.5 73.0 72.1 
Denmark 2 2   82.1 75.1 181.5 
Spain 7 6 4 182.8 120.7 145.7 
Finland 3 3   236.4 213.0 216.4 
France 34 31 1 114.7 77.2 606.5 
United Kingdom 46 38   119.3 73.7 187.8 
Greece 1 1 1 413.3 115.1 150.6 
Ireland 1 1 1 128.6 54.8 169.5 
Italy 10 10   167.9 124.8 281.7 
Japan 92 81 3 101.2 59.5 233.4 
Luxembourg 5 3   193.4 39.0 61.9 
Mexico 3 2   177.4 114.0 335.8 
Netherlands 14 12 1 67.5 58.4 191.1 
Portugal 3 3   273.8 155.2 186.1 
Russian 
Federation 1 1 1 246.7 207.9 154.7 
United States 146   9 136.2 70.4 253.6 
Venezuela 1     1298.5 979.0 1527.8 
              
By listing type / exchange           
LEVEL I 165           
LEVEL II 34           
LEVEL III 19           
144 A 5           
London Main 
Market 23           
 
Movement in a country‟s CCR signifies a credit rating event. A change greater than or equal 
to 1 (less than or equal to -1) indicates an upgrade (downgrade) of the country‟s letter credit rating, 
while a change between 0 and 1 or between -1 and 0 usually indicates, respectively, an upward or 
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downward revision in the sovereign‟s credit outlook. The succession of credit rating events of 
sovereigns and their distribution per year is set forth in Table 2. 
From August 2006 until March 2016, there are 121 single event days (with 41 positive and 80 
negative rating announcements). Figure 1 shows the average corporate CDS spreads of Spain reflect 
higher credit risk during the negative credit events in 2011. 
 
 
Table 2: Sampled Negative and Positive Sovereign Credit Events 
 
Sovereign 
Credit Events  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Grand 
Total 
NEGATIVE 1 2 1 9 11 18 14 4 5 10 5 80 
POSITIVE 3 3 4 4 1 4 
 
5 12 5 
 
41 
Grand Total 4 5 5 13 12 22 14 9 17 15 5 121 
 
 
On October 2011, Spain was downgraded from Aa2 to A1. Spain‟s sovereign debt was 
further downgraded from A1 to A3 in February 2012. The movement of the corporate CDS spreads 
seem to suggest the possibility that these downgrades did not come as a surprise. Hence, it is 
possible that previous sovereign downgrades may help explain variation in the corporeate CDS 
market.  
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Figure 1: Spain average corporate CDS spreads 
 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
We investigate the reaction of several corporate CDS to changes in sovereign credit ratings 
and credit outlook updates provided by Moody‟s for the years 2006 through 2015. Taking the same 
approach, we explore the reaction of stock prices to changes in sovereign credit ratings. Using the 
corporate CDS spread returns over the two-day period surrounding the sovereign credit event, we 
measure the response of the corporate CDS market. There are a few advantages of our chosen two-
day window. We preclude the event window contamination problem while correcting for non-
synchronous trading that may occurr due to differences in time zone between the the trade venue 
and the U.S., where Moody‟s makes the credit announcnement. 
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4.1 Event Study 
We seek to determine how corporate CDS markets typically react to sovereign credit rating 
events. Additionally, we utilize the corporate CDS spreads to investigate the anticipatory effects 
prior to their announcement of sovereign credit events. we aim to answer outstanding questions on 
if sovereign events are largely unexpected or absorbed by the corporate CDS market prior to credit 
events. In the event that credit events are not anticipated, we expect that CDS spreads should 
change dramatically.  
 
4.1.1 2-day window reactions to events in corporate CDS and equity markets:  
Table 3 reports basic statistics of two-day CDS spread changes, spread percent changes, stock 
price changes and stock price percent changes of event country firms during sovereign rating events. 
For any rating event in country i occurring at time t, the two-day CDS spread change (stock price 
change) and spread percent change (stock price percent change) are calculated for the period [-1, 1], 
where day zero is considered the event day. A positive event is an upgrade of the Moody‟s letter 
credit rating or upward revision in the sovereign‟s credit outlook. A negative event is a downgrade of 
the Moody‟s letter credit rating or downward revision in the sovereign‟s credit outlook. Our 
variables of interest include, the two-day [-1,  1] percentage change in the CDS spreads of firms 
occurring around a given sovereign credit event. The 2-day window is preferred, in order to capture 
the immediate reaction to the announcement. In latter analysis, we explore a 30-day window to 
explore the longer term effects of changes in the credit environment.  
Basic statistics of the two-day CDS spread changes are presented in Table 3. The two-day CDS 
spread change over period [t-1, t + 1] is defined as the difference between the CDS spread at time t 
+ 1 and that of t -1, given a rating event at time t.  The CDS spread percent change is the CDS 
spread change over period [t - 1, t + 1] to the CDS spread at time t - 1. During the two-day period  
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Table 3: Two-day corporate CDS and stock price reactions to events 
 
 
surrounding the 40 positive sovereign credit events, CDS spreads of domiciled firms with 
corresponding data available, declined, on average, by 0.8 bps. Expectedly, subsequent to a negative 
event, the average CDS premium increased by a total of 2.6 bps from day -1 to day 1. Within the 
two-day period of a positive sovereign credit event, the average stock prices of corporations rose by 
0.5%. We find that, during negative credit events, average stock prices decline by 0.8%, which 
   No. obs. Mean Median Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Panel A: Two-day CDS spread changes (bps)       
Positive events 40 -0.772 -0.665 17.481 -1.839 54.647 
Negative events 80 2.612 0.092 23.003 15.012 370.320 
              
Panel A: Two-day CDS percent changes (%)       
Positive events 40 -0.8% -0.8% 0.048 1.547 15.137 
Negative events 80 0.9% 0.1% 0.049 0.225 10.233 
              
Panel A: Two-day stock price changes        
Positive events 40 12.087 0.403 109.342 17.249 303.845 
Negative events 80 -4.072 -0.220 56.317 -11.182 274.104 
              
Panel A: Two-day stock price percent changes (%)       
Positive events 40 0.5% 0.9% 0.026 -0.543 1.327 
Negative events 80 -0.8% -0.6% 0.028 -0.159 1.329 
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supports the notion that movements in CDS premiums and stock prices have an inverse 
relationship.  
 
4.1.2 30-day window reactions to events in corporate CDS and equity markets:  
From our results in table  4, 30 days prior to Moody‟s announcements of positive sovereign 
credit rating upgrades or outlooks, we do not find evidence that corporate CDS spreads anticipate 
these events. Corporate CDS reactions are not found to be significant, prior to positive sovereign 
announcements, therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of lack of anticipation of positive 
sovereign credit events by corporate CDS spreads. With respect to the anticipation of negative 
events, we find a 1.06% median increase in corporate CDS spreads, which is significant at the 5% 
level, though the rest of the evidence is mixed and does not support the notion that corporate CDS 
spreads anticipate negative sovereign events.   
30 days following favorable sovereign credit announcements in period [t, t+29], findings in 
Table 4 suggest significant reactions in the corporate CDS spreads for both positive and negative 
events, though corporate CDS spreads do not appear to decrease following favorable events as 
expected. Upon closer examination of both groups of firms separately in table 5, we find that both 
domestically listed and cross-listed firms exhibit this trait. We find consistently significant reactions 
in corporate CDS markets following negative sovereign announcements, as spreads rise by 22.16%, 
as seen in Table 4.One reason for our less than significant results prior to the announcement of 
positive events may be due to the possibility that positive sovereign events are widely anticipated for 
a long period of time, as a result of widely disseminated positive information to herald positive 
changes in economic and financial indicators.  
 
 
58 
 
Table 4: 30-Day corporate CDS reaction to sovereign credit events 
All firms               
  Positive events     Negative events   
  Period [-29,0] Period [0,29]   Period [-29,0] Period [0,29] 
Thirty-day CDS spread changes (bps)           
Mean -0.066 8.732**     -8.699   18.019*** 
t-test pval. 0.511 0.027     0.997   0.000 
Median -1.582 2.183     0.414   8.688*** 
t-test pval. 0.745 0.314     0.449   0.000 
Thirty-day CDS spread percent changes (%)         
Mean 1.04% 4.28%***     0.05%   22.16%*** 
t-test pval. 0.214 0.000     0.467   0.000 
Median -2.20% 3.25%***     1.06%**   18.99%*** 
t-test pval. 0.745 0.000     0.038   0.000 
* Significance at 10% level is denoted. 
** Significance at 5% level is denoted. 
*** Significance at 1% level is denoted. 
 
 
 
4.1.3 Cross-listed vs. non-cross-listed firms’ 30-day window reactions to events in corporate CDS markets:  
In table 5, we find that spreads of both groups of firms increase following negative events. 
however, this effect appears to be more dramatic for firms that are not cross-listed, as their CDS 
spreads rise by 34.7% relative to a 17.3%  increase in the CDS spreads of cross-listed firms following 
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the announcement of unfavorable sovereign events. this is consistent with our hypothesis that cross-
listed firms cope better during downturns. We do not observe a decrease in the CDS spreads of 
both groups following positive sovereign events. In addition to the possibility that positive events do 
not come as a surprise, due to government announcements prior to Moody‟s, it is possibile that 
positive events may have been previously announced by S&P or Fitch. In such a scenario, Moody‟s 
sovereign upgrades would contain limited information. We formally compare the reaction of both 
groups of firms in latter regressions. 
 
 
4.2 Proportions of negative and positive Corporate CDS reactions following events 
As means are affected by outliers, another way to test whether rating events transmit new 
information to CDS markets is to evaluate the proportion of negative and positive CDS spread 
changes over the period [-1, 1]. We present these results in Table 6. We employ the chi-square test 
for equality of proportions to determine if the proportions of negative and positive CDS spread 
changes around credit events are significantly different from each other. It is expected that positive 
sovereign credit events beget improved corporate credit conditions, implied by decreasing (i.e., 
negative changes) CDS spreads of firms. Negative events should be associated with rising (i.e., 
positive changes) CDS spreads. 
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Table 5: Cross-listed vs. non-cross-listed firms’ 30-Day CDS reaction to sovereign credit 
events 
Panel A: Not Cross-listed firms             
  Positive events     Negative events   
  Period [-29,0] Period [0,29]   Period [-29,0] Period [0,29] 
Thirty-day CDS spread changes (bps)           
Mean -0.748 7.119     6.238   61.979 
Thirty-day CDS spread changes (bps)           
Mean 2.20% 6.17%     2.86%   34.70% 
                
 
Panel B: Cross-listed firms             
  Positive events     Negative events   
  Period [-29,0] Period [0,29]   Period [-29,0] Period [0,29] 
Thirty-day CDS spread changes (bps)           
Mean -1.449 4.520     -18.381   -2.390 
Thirty-day CDS spread changes (bps)           
Mean -1.42% 3.34%     -1.57%   17.30% 
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Generally, positive rating events appear to be associated with changes in corporate CDS 
spreads, although our results do not suggest a significant relationship in Table 6 Panel B, we do not 
obtain significant results for decreases, i.e. negative changes in CDS spreads in the periods prior to 
positive events. Based on these results, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that firms‟ CDSs 
anticipate positive sovereign events. Focusing on the two-day period around positive events, more 
than 64% of corporate CDSs in event countries decline from day -1 to day 1. Broadly, our results 
however, do not suggest a significant relationship between positive sovereign events and reactions in 
CDSs of firms. Prior to negative sovereign credit announcements as seen in Table 6 Panel B for 
periods [t-90, t-61] and [t-60, t-31], 64% and 55% of of CDS spreads suffer from positive changes, 
respectively. These results , are significant at the 1% level, and support the hypothesis that corporate 
CDS markets anticipate negative sovereign events. The CDS spreads of firms are expected to 
increase, following negative credit events, and decrease subsequent to  announcements of positive 
events.  
These results continue to hold when we divide the firms into groups of cross-listed and non-
cross-listed in Table 7. We do expect the majority of positive events to be associated with negative 
changes in corporate CDS spreads. Our findings indicate that during positive events, in time [t-1, 
t+1], more than 80% of the positive upgrades and outlooks, are associated with shrinking CDS 
spreads of non-cross-listed firms, compared to less than 54% of the positive events for cross-listed 
firms. This result, though not significant, appears to lend support to the idea that the CDS spreads 
of domestically listed firms react more favorably following positive sovereign events.  This is 
consistent with the idea that domestically listed firms, having limited financing options, are expected 
to benefit more from an improved credit outlook. An alternative explanation could be that the CDS 
spreads of cross-listed firms reflect positve sovereign credit information long before it is announced, 
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due to investors or bondholders of cross-listed firms having better information about sovereign 
credit conditions, combined with lower firm-level information asymmetry.  
 
Table 6: Chi-square test for equality of proportions of negative and positive firm 
reactions 
 
The proportion of positive and negative CDS spread changes of event country firms before 
and after the period surrounding a rating event. This table reports the proportion of negative 
and positive CDS spread changes over the periods [-1, 1], [0, 9], [0, 19], and [0, 29], where 
the sovereign credit rating event date is considered day zero. The last row in each time 
period presents the chi-square test for equal proportions and p-values. 
No. of 
pos./neg. 
firm CDS 
spread 
changes 
All 
sovereign 
rating 
events 
Credit 
rating 
changes 
Outlook 
changes   
All 
sovereign 
rating 
events 
Credit 
rating 
changes 
Outlook 
changes 
  All firms - CDS spread changes         
  Positive events     Negative events   
                
 [-1,1]               
Positive 120 5 115   619 185 434 
  35.82% 38.46% 35.71%   55.62% 52.86% 56.88% 
Negative 215 8 207   494 165 329 
  64.18% 61.54% 64.29%   44.38% 47.14% 43.12% 
χ2 test 0.041       1.574     
  (0.839)       (0.210)     
[0,9]               
Positive 215 7 208   534 113 421 
  64.95% 53.85% 65.41%   46.52% 31.22% 53.56% 
Negative 116 6 110   614 249 365 
  35.05% 46.15% 34.59%   53.48% 68.78% 46.44% 
χ2 test 0.734       49.750***     
  (0.392)       (0.000)     
[0,19]               
Positive 197 7 190   605 122 483 
  59.88% 53.85% 60.13%   54.50% 35.06% 63.39% 
Negative 132 6 126   505 226 279 
  40.12% 46.15% 39.87%   45.50% 64.94% 36.61% 
χ2 test 0.205       77.313***     
  (0.651)       (0.000)     
[0,29]               
Positive 199 6 193   786 164 622 
  62.78% 46.15% 63.49%   68.11% 45.30% 78.54% 
Negative 118 7 111   368 198 170 
  37.22% 53.85% 36.51%   31.89% 54.70% 21.46% 
χ2 test 1.603       126.319***     
  (0.206)       (0.000)     
 
63 
 
 
Table 6 Panel B: Chi-square test for equality of proportions of negative and positive firm 
reactions prior to events 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. of 
pos./neg. 
firm CDS 
spread 
changes 
All 
sovereign 
rating 
events 
Credit 
rating 
changes 
Outlook 
changes   
All 
sovereign 
rating 
events 
Credit 
rating 
changes 
Outlook 
changes 
  CDS spread changes           
  Positive events     Negative events   
[-60,-31] 
   
        
Positive 148 3 145   621 164 457 
  44.58% 30.00% 45.03%   55.45% 45.18% 60.37% 
Negative 184 7 177   499 199 300 
  55.42% 70.00% 54.97%   44.55% 54.82% 39.63% 
χ2 test 0.89 
  
  108.26***     
 
(0.35) 
  
  (0.00)     
[-90,-61]               
Positive 112 2 110   616 213 403 
  32.94% 22.22% 33.23%   63.90% 58.68% 67.05% 
Negative 228 7 221   348 150 198 
  67.06% 77.78% 66.77%   36.10% 41.32% 32.95% 
χ2 test 0.48       6.88***     
  (0.49)       (0.01)     
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No. of 
pos./neg. 
firm CDS 
spread 
changes
All 
sovereig
n rating 
events
Credit 
rating 
changes
Outlook 
changes
All 
sovereig
n rating 
events
Credit 
rating 
changes
Outlook 
changes
All 
sovereig
n rating 
events
Credit 
rating 
changes
Outlook 
changes
All 
sovereig
n rating 
events
Credit 
rating 
changes
Outlook 
changes
Cross-listed firms' CDS spread changes Non cross-listed firms' CDS spread changes
Positive events Negative events Positive events Negative events
 [-1,1]
Positive 78 3 75 374 159 215 28 0 28 208 12 196
46.15% 42.86% 46.30% 52.16% 53.18% 51.44% 19.72% 0.00% 19.86% 60.64% 40.00% 62.62%
Negative 91 4 87 343 140 203 114 1 113 135 18 117
53.85% 57.14% 53.70% 47.84% 46.82% 48.56% 80.28% 100.00% 80.14% 39.36% 60.00% 37.38%
χ2 test 0.032 0.212 0.247 5.869
p-value '(0.858) '(0.645) (0.619) (0.015)**
[0,9]
Positive 120 4 116 289 94 195 84 0 84 224 12 212
71.86% 57.14% 72.50% 38.64% 30.32% 44.52% 60.00% 0.00% 60.43% 64.55% 38.71% 67.09%
Negative 47 3 44 459 216 243 56 1 55 123 19 104
28.14% 42.86% 27.50% 61.36% 69.68% 55.48% 40.00% 100.00% 39.57% 35.45% 61.29% 32.91%
χ2 test 0.782 15.434*** 1.511 9.936**
p-value (0.376) (0.000) (0.219) (0.002)
[0,19]
Positive 113 4 109 338 101 237 77 0 77 232 7 225
67.26% 57.14% 67.70% 46.94% 33.89% 56.16% 55.00% 0.00% 55.80% 68.84% 24.14% 73.05%
Negative 55 3 52 382 197 185 63 2 61 105 22 83
32.74% 42.86% 32.30% 53.06% 66.11% 43.84% 45.00% 100.00% 44.20% 31.16% 75.86% 26.95%
χ2 test 0.340 34.775*** 2.480 29.564***
p-value (0.56) (0.000) (0.115) (0.000)
[0,29]
Positive 101 4 97 448 137 311 90 0 90 311 14 297
61.59% 57.14% 61.78% 59.42% 44.19% 70.05% 69.77% 0.00% 70.31% 89.63% 45.16% 93.99%
Negative 63 3 60 306 173 133 39 1 38 36 17 19
38.41% 42.86% 38.22% 40.58% 55.81% 29.95% 30.23% 100.00% 29.69% 10.37% 54.84% 6.01%
χ2 test 0.061 50.593*** 2.326 72.38***
p-value (0.805) (0.000) (0.127) (0.000)
The proportion of positive and negative CDS spread changes of event country firms before and after the period surrounding a rating event. This table 
reports the proportion of negative and positive CDS spread changes over the periods [-1, 1], [0, 9], [0, 19], and [0, 29], where the sovereign credit 
rating event date is considered day zero. The last row in each time period presents the chi-square test for equal proportions and p-values.
Table 7: Chi-square test for equality of proportions of negative and positive reactions of CDSs of two groups 
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The literature reports that cross-listed firms can improve information problems by deciding to cross-
list (Fernandes and Ferreira (2008), Karolyi (2012)). 
Relative to negative events, we obtain strikingly different results for cross-listed firms, when 
compared to firms that are not cross-listed. First, negative events appear to matter for both groups 
of firms, as a majority of firms suffer from a positive change in CDS spreads in period [-1, 1], albeit, 
only a slight majority of cross-listed firms. In the 30-day period after negative events, CDS 
premiums are expected to rise.  In this regard, the initial reaction of the CDS spreads of cross-listed 
firms are not in line with this expectation, as  61% and 53% of spreads taper in periods [0, 9] and 
[10, 19], respectively.   
Overall, 59% of the changes in CDS premiums of cross-listed firms experience an increase 
in the 30 day period subsequent to negative events. During the course of the 30-day period, the 
proportion of CDS spreads of non-cross-listed firms that experience increases is increasingly a 
majority. From the outset of negative events in period [-1, 1] , a significant proportion (60.6%) of 
the changes in CDS spreads of non-cross-listed firms experience increases in CDS spreads. 
This is not much higher than the 52.2% of CDSs of cross-listed firms that increase, though not a 
significantly different proportion. The unfavorable sovereign credit news is progressively 
incorporated in both groups of firms over the 30 day period. Among non-cross-listed (cross-listed) 
firms, following the negative event, roughly 90% (60%) of the changes in in CDS premiums 
represent increase, both significant at the 1% level. This suggests that both groups of firms are 
significantly affected by negative sovereign events, though this test this does not address the 
outstanding question regarding which group of firms is more significantly affected by changes in 
sovereign risk. In the next section, we investigate the differential CDS spread reactions of firms with 
cross-listings vs. firms without. 
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4.3 OLS and Panel Regressions of corporate credit risk and sovereign risk  
 
We formally analyze the effect of variations in sovereign risk on corporate credit risk by  
regressing changes in monthly corporate CDS spreads on changes in sovereign cumulative 
comprehensive credit rating (CCR) changes. The cumulative comprehensive credit rating change 
comprises a change in sovereign credit rating and change in outlook.  
 
4.3.1 Sovereign credit risk and corporate credit risk specifications 
The literature suggests a number of variables that affect credit spreads. (Collin-Dufresne, et 
al., 2001; Campbell and Taksler, 2003) and sovereign credit spreads (Longstaff et al., 2011; 
Dieckmann and Plank, 2012). We therefore include a number of control variables suggested by the 
literature as determinants of corporate and sovereign CDS credit spreads.  
Local/country variables. Corporate and sovereign creditworthiness are affected by the general state 
of the economy. The credit quality of corporations and firms are thus expected to be affected by an 
improvement or deterioration of the business climate in the country of domicile. To control for the 
state of the economy, we make use of two variables:  
 
Domestic country excess returns, measured as difference between log returns on the domestic 
market index and log returns on a benchmark index. Domestic excess volatility is calculated using 
weekly changes in the standard deviation of local excess returns. These variables are described in 
Appendix table A.2. 
 
Idiosyncratic/firm variables. A firm‟s probability of default is importantly linked to its equity returns 
and risk. Broad movements and volatility across equity markets generally affect all firms in an 
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economy. However, firm-specific equity returns and risk can play a bigger role in determining a 
firm's probability of default.  Corporate CDS spreads of firms should have a positive (negative) 
correlation with idiosyncratic volatility (equity returns). We use firm excess returns, and proxy 
variations in idiosyncratic volatility with changes in the standard deviation of firm excess returns. 
Given the choice of control variables, we estimate the following pooled OLS regression: 
 
Δ(CCDSi jt) = αi + βΔ(CCRjt) + γΔXi jt + δt + εi jt     (1) 
 
where 
Δ(CCDSi jt) = (CCDSi jt+29 - CCDSi jt) / CCDSi jt 
 
i.e., Δ(CCDSi jt) is the 30-day percentage change in the CDS spread of firm i headquartered in 
country j from day t to day t+29, Δ(CCRjt) is the change in the cumulative comprehensive credit 
rating of country j on day t, ΔXi jt are the changes from day t to day t+29 in the local and firm 
(idiosyncratic) variables, and αi and δt are firm and time fixed effects. The models include simple 
OLS, fixed effects and random effects, each provided for negative, positive and non-events. The 
three models include the control variables, ΔXi jt described in Table A2. 
We obtain generally consistent results across models for OLS, fixed, and random effects, suggesting 
the existence of a significant relationship between changes in sovereign credit risk and reactions of 
corporate CDS spreads. Negative sovereign credit events are associated with an increase in 
corporate CDS spreads. Relative to positive events, our OLS results suggest that an increase in 
sovereign credit ratings is significantly associated with a decline in corporate CDS spreads,
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Table 8 
Sovereign risk and corporate credit risk: Δ(CCDSi jt) = αi + βΔ(CCRjt) + γΔXi jt + δt + εi jt  
where 
Δ(CCDSi jt) = (CCDSi jt+29 - CCDSi jt) / CCDSi jt . This table shows the effect of changes in sovereign credit risk on corporate credit risk. The dependent variable, 
Δ(CCDSi jt), is the monthly change in corporate CDS spread. Panels A, B and C report the results for negative, positive and non-events for specification (1), 
respectively.  The models include simple OLS, fixed effects and random effects each provided for negative, positive and non-events. Three models include the 
control variables described in Table A2. where changes in country j sovereign credit risk, ΔCCRjt, is the change in comprehensive credit ratings of event 
countries at time t. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Intercept βΔ(CCRjt) Firm exc retjt 
ΔFirm 
voljt  Loc exc retjt ΔLoc voljt 
Hausman test 
H0: RE vs. FE Adj R2 
Negative Events                 
OLS 0.390 0.264*** -0.097*** -0.009 0.017 0.007   0.188 
  [.000] [.000] [.005] [.439] [.656] [.510]     
FE   0.292*** -0.058 -0.016 0.154** 0.02*   0.258 
    [.000] [.320] [.153] [.012] [.074]     
RE 0.380 0.267*** -0.099*** -0.010 0.010 0.008 56.295*** 0.188 
  [.000] [.000] [.004] [.363] [.801] [.459] [.0000]   
Positive Events                 
OLS 0.144 -0.147** 0.107*** -0.024** -0.13*** 0.038***   0.082 
  [.000] [.042] [.004] [.034] [.001] [.001]     
FE   0.014 0.069 0.510 0.032 -0.123     
    [.952] [.772] [.161] [.864] [.735]     
RE 0.024 0.064* 0.232*** -0.022** -0.141*** 0.014 3.248 0.030 
  [.129] [.081] [.000] [.043] [.000] [.183] [.6619]   
Non events                 
OLS 0.225 0.13*** -0.107*** -0.005 -0.146*** -0.005   0.116 
  [.000] [.000] [.000] [.630] [.000] [.622]     
FE   0.14*** -0.129*** -0.016 -0.121*** 0.005   0.124 
    [.000] [.002] [.153] [.004] [.669]     
RE 0.224 0.131*** -0.108*** -0.005 -0.146*** -0.005 16.548*** 0.119 
  [.000] [.000] [.000] [.610] [.000] [.640] [.0054]   
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though our random effects model suggests a weakly significant relationship characterized by 
an increase in CDS spreads.2 
  
 
4.3.2 Differential reaction of Cross-listed vs. Non-cross-listed firms to Sovereign risk  
 
In this section, we investigate the possibility of cross-listing as a channel though which 
sovereign risk is transferred to corporate CDSs. Hail and Leuz (2009) show that firms with cross-
listings on U.S. exchanges experience a decrease in their cost of capital between 70 and 120 basis 
points  
Cross-listed firms have been found to improve their information as a result of increased regulatory 
filings and analyst coverage. Ashcraft and Santos (2009) find economically significant adverse effects 
to the cost of debt of risky and informationally-opaque firms, due to CDS trading. To evaluate 
whether cross-listed firms have a differential reaction to changes in sovereign risk, we create an 
indicator variable (Di) that takes a value of one if the firm is not cross-listed in the U.S. or London. 
We then enrich specification (1) with the interaction terms between Di and our main variable of 
interest, Δ (CCRjt). 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Lack of statistical significance of the Hausman specification test for positive events points to 
random effect panel data model as preferred to fixed effect. 
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Δ(CCDSi jt) = αi + βΔ(CCRjt) + λDi Δ(CCRjt) + γΔXi jt + δt + εi j (2) 
 
 
In specification (2), λ encapsulates the extra-sensitivity to changes in sovereign credit quality for 
non-cross-listed firms. In line with our earlier analysis, we estimate specification (2) dynamic panel. 
To empirically assess the relevance of the cross-listing channel, we use non-cross-listed firms as the 
indicator variable Di in specification (2). Regression coefficients are reported in Table 9. Our results 
provide evidence supporting the hypothesis of a statistically significant differential reaction of non-
cross-listed firms‟ CDSs, following sovereign credit events. the coefficient on λDi Δ(CCRjt) suggests 
that the credit risk of non-cross-listed firms is significantly more affected by negative changes in 
sovereign credit quality. We do not find evidence of a significant reaction of non-cross-listed firms 
to positive events.  
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Table 9 
Sovereign risk and corporate credit risk of non-cross-listed firms: Δ(CCDSi jt) = αi + βΔ(CCRjt) +  λDi Δ(CCRjt) + γΔXi jt + δt + εi jt  
where, Δ(CCDSi jt) = (CCDSi jt+29 - CCDSi jt) / CCDSi jt . This table shows the effect of the spillover from sovereign to corporate credit risk for non-cross-listed firms. The 
dependent variable, Δ(CCDSi jt), is the monthly change in corporate CDS spread. Di equals one if the firmis not cross-listed on a stock exchange in the U.S. or London. 
The interaction term is between Δ(CCRjt) and Di. Panels A, B and C report the results for negative, positve and non-events for specification (2), respectively.  The 
models include simple OLS, fixed effects and random effects, each provided for negative, positive and non-events. Three models include the control variables, ΔXi jt 
described in Table A2. where changes in country j sovereign credit risk, ΔCCRjt, is the change in comprehensive credit ratings of event countries at time t. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Intercept βΔ(CCRjt)  λDi Δ(CCRjt)  Firm exc retjt ΔFirm voljt  Loc exc retjt ΔLoc voljt 
Hausman test 
H0:RE vs. FE 
Adj 
R2 
Negative Events                   
OLS 0.403 0.197*** 0.115*** -0.083** -0.007 0.007 0.006   0.200 
  [.000] [.000] [.000] [.016] [.544] [.845] [.607]     
FE   0.159*** 0.205*** -0.060 -0.015 0.131** 0.018   0.282 
    [.000] [.000] [.292] [.184] [.030] [.108]     
RE 0.390 0.187*** 0.132*** -0.087** -0.008 -0.001 0.006 61.898*** 0.200 
  [.000] [.000] [.000] [.012] [.434] [.974] [.539] [.0000]   
Positive Events                   
OLS 0.090 -0.147** -0.008 0.106*** -0.024** -0.128*** 0.038***   0.079 
  [.001] [.042] [.875] [.005] [.034] [.002] [.001]     
FE   0.019 -0.147 0.075 0.497 0.032 -0.116     
    [.939] [.924] [.772] [.221] [.871] [.765]     
RE 0.036 0.066* -0.054 0.23*** -0.022** -0.136*** 0.017 2.896 0.027 
  [.064] [.070] [.288] [.000] [.037] [.000] [.117] [.8217]   
Non events                   
OLS 0.228 0.08*** 0.079*** -0.1*** -0.004 -0.159*** -0.006   0.282 
  [.000] [.000] [.002] [.001] [.701] [.000] [.519]     
FE   0.061** 0.124*** -0.126*** -0.014 -0.139*** 0.002   0.136 
    [.022] [.000] [.002] [.190] [.001] [.812]     
RE 0.226 0.078*** 0.082*** -0.102*** -0.004 -0.159*** -0.006 20.426*** 0.200 
  [.000] [.000] [.001] [.001] [.666] [.000] [.544] [.0023]   
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4.3.3 Additional Test of Differential reaction of Cross-listed vs. Non-cross-listed firms to Sovereign risk  
 
To further analyze the differential effects of sovereign credit risk on non-cross-listed vs. cross-listed 
firm, we add δt Di  to specification (2), as follows: 
 
Δ(CCDSi jt) = αi + βΔ(CCRjt) + λDi Δ (CCRjt) + γΔXi jt + δt + δt Di + εi j  (3) 
 
Di as the indicator variable in specification (2) and estimated with OLS, fixed and random effects , 
similar to our earlier analysis. Findings in Table 10 are largely consistent with those found in Table 9. 
It is suggested by the significant p-values of the coefficients of λDi Δ (CCRjt) and the newly added δt 
Di variable, that during negative sovereign credit events, there is higher sensitivity of the CDS 
spreads of non-cross-listed firms compared to cross-listed firms.  
This finding is consistent with the idea that when sovereign risk increases, the sensitivity 
value of an option to access foreign capital via cross-listings increases. Our fixed effects results do 
not suggest higher sensitivity of non-cross-listed firms to positive events. The hausman test 
precludes consideration of the results from our random effects model, which suggests extra-
sensitivity of the CDS spreads of non-cross-listed firms to positive changes in sovereign credit 
quality. We run specifications (2) and (3) again using dummy fixed effects and robusted 
heteroscedasticity OLS regressions and obtain results set forth in appendix tables A.3 and A.4, and 
consistent with the findings in tables 8, 9 and 10. Taken together, our results show strong significant 
results for greater adverse reactions of the CDS spreads of non-cross-listed firms to unfavorable 
sovereign credit risk. 
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Table 10 
Further test of Sovereign risk and corporate credit risk of non-cross-listed firms: Δ(CCDSi jt) = αi + βΔ(CCRjt) +  λDi Δ(CCRjt) + γΔXi jt + δt + δt Di + εi jt  
where, Δ(CCDSi jt) = (CCDSi jt+29 - CCDSi jt) / CCDSi jt . This table shows the effect of changes in sovereign credit risk on corporate credit risk. The dependent variable, Δ(CCDSi jt), 
is the monthly change in corporate CDS spread. Di equals one if the firmis not cross-listed on a stock exchange in the U.S. or London. The interaction term is between 
Δ(CCRjt) and Di  as well as between time fixed effects and Di. Panels A, B and C report the results for negative, positve and non-events for specification (3), respectively.  
The models include simple OLS, fixed effects and random effects each provided for negative, positive and non-events. Three models include the control variables, ΔXi jt 
described in Table A2. where changes in country j sovereign credit risk, ΔCCRjt, is the change in comprehensive credit ratings of event countries at time t. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Intercept βΔ(CCRjt)  λDi Δ(CCRjt)  
Firm exc 
retjt ΔFirm voljt  Loc exc retjt ΔLoc voljt δt Di  
Hausman test 
H0:RE vs. FE Adj R2 
Negative Events                     
OLS 0.335 0.159*** 0.17*** -0.082** -0.007 0.017 0.006 0.089**   0.203 
  [.000] [.000] [.000] [.018] [.543] [.654] [.586] [.040]     
FE   0.159*** 0.205*** -0.060 -0.015 0.131** 0.018     0.281 
    [.000] [.000] [.293] [.184] [.030] [.108]       
RE 0.310 0.149*** 0.187*** -0.086** -0.008 0.010 0.007 0.105** 58.127*** 0.208 
  [.000] [.000] [.000] [.013] [.436] [.801] [.516] [.020] [.000]   
Positive Events                     
OLS 0.050 -0.071 -0.181 0.107*** -0.026** -0.123*** 0.042*** 0.076   0.082 
  [.217] [.425] [.167] [.004] [.025] [.004] [.001] [.152]     
FE   -0.071 -0.181 0.107*** -0.026** -0.123*** 0.042***       
    [.425] [.167] [.004] [.025] [.004] [.001]       
RE   0.019 -0.147 0.075 0.497 0.032 -0.116 0.15*** 2.362 0.070 
    [.943] [.928] [.785] [.246] [.879] [.778] [.000] [.8836]   
Non events                     
OLS 0.193 0.064*** 0.100*** -0.101*** -0.004 -0.158*** -0.007 0.042   0.122 
  [.000] [.009] [.001] [.001] [.697] [.000] [.504] [.162]     
FE   0.061** 0.124*** -0.126*** -0.014 -0.139*** 0.002     0.135 
    [.022] [.000] [.002] [.190] [.001] [.812]       
RE 0.192 0.063*** 0.102*** -0.102*** -0.004 -0.158*** -0.006 0.043 19.116*** 0.122 
  [.000] [.010] [.001] [.001] [.666] [.000] [.527] [.170] [.0040]   
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5 CONCLUSION  
 
We find significant market responses in the corporate CDS market for evidence of 
contagion around unanticipated negative and positive sovereign credit ratings and outlook changes. 
Sovereign credit events are found to be associated with significant changes in corporate CDS 
spreads and variability in equity returns, suggesting the presence of contagion effects across markets. 
First, relative to anticipation of sovereign credit events in the corporate CDS market, our findings 
support the hypothesis that corporate CDS spreads anticipate negative sovereign events.  Leading up 
to the date of announcement of negative events, corporate CDS spreads rise, and continue to do so 
following the negative announcement, as new information is incorporated in the corporate CDS 
spreads over time. Comparing groups of cross-listed and domestically listed firms, we find 
significantly differential reactions in CDS markets. Our findings suggest that sovereign credit events 
are transmitted more strongly to non-cross-listed firms than firms with cross-listings. Possible 
reasons for this finding could in fact be due to cross-listed firms‟ better access to external capital and 
less degree of asymmetric information, relative to non-cross-listed peers with lower level of investor 
recognition. Oehmke and Zawadowski (2014) find that speculative trading concentrates in the CDS 
market which serves as “alternative trading venues” for both hedging and speculation in the 
underlying bond. Firms that are not cross-listed typically have less analyst coverage and information, 
such that they may face more short selling pressure decisions, via the CDS market.  
Our findings suggest that positive events are generally not anticipated and do not convey 
new information. Taken together, we find that negative sovereign credit events generally have 
unfavorably significant effects on the majority of firms, though, as we show through corporate CDS 
reactions, cross-listed firms cope significantly better. This is consistent with the idea that when  
sovereign risk increases, the sensitivity value of an option to access external capital for cross-listed 
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companies increases. Broadly, our results provide new evidence relevant to investors and financial 
institutions in determining sovereign credit risk germane to corporate financial risk, for the 
construction of debt and equity portfolios, and hedging considerations in today‟s dynamic 
environment. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1
Assigning numerical values to Moody's letter credit ratings and outlooks
Credit Rating Numerical Value
Aaa 17
Aa1 16
Aa2 15
Aa3 14
A1 13
A2 12
A3 11
Baa1 10
Baa2 9
Baa3 8
Ba1 7
Ba2 6
Ba3 5
B1 4
B2 3
B3 2
Caa1 1
Caa2 1
Caa3 1
Ca 0
C -1
Positive 0.5
RUR+ 0.25
stable 0
RUR- -0.25
Negative -0.5
N
O
N
-I
N
V
ES
TM
EN
T 
G
R
A
D
E 
SP
EC
U
LA
TI
V
E 
IN
V
ES
TM
EN
T 
G
R
A
D
E
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Table A.2 
Control variables. 
This table provides a detailed description of the control variables included in the model 
specifications and their source. 
Variable  Description 
Source 
 
 Firm exc retjt
  
  
Firm's stock log return in excess of the log 
return in the domestic Dow Jones Total 
Market index 
Bloomberg 
ΔFirm voljt 
Change in the firm's (annualized) idiosyncratic 
volatility, computed as rolling standard 
deviation 
of the firm's excess stock returns over the past 
180 days 
 Bloomberg 
 Loc exc retjt 
 Log return in the domestic Dow Jones Total 
Market index in excess of the log return in the 
EuroStoxx 50 index or local benchmark 
 Bloomberg; Fed (St. Louis) 
ΔLoc voljt 
Change in the domestic (annualized) volatility, 
computed as rolling standard deviation of the 
local excess stock returns over the past 180 
days 
Bloomberg; Fed (St. Louis) 
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Table A.3. Supplemenary Regression Tests of spillover to corporate risk 
 
Δ(CCDSi jt) = αi + βΔ(CCRjt) + γΔXi jt + εi jt 
 
 Dummy Fixed Effect  Robust Heteroscedasticity OLS 
 
All 
CCR 
Negative 
CCR 
 All 
CCR 
Negative 
CCR 
Positive 
CCR 
βΔ(CCRjt)           0.14*** 
(7.021) 
0.292*** 
(9.968) 
 0.13*** 
(10.246) 
0.264*** 
(10.29) 
-0.147 
(-1.157) 
Firm exc retjt -0.129*** 
(-4.267) 
-0.058 
(-1.387) 
 -0.107*** 
(-4.316) 
-0.097*** 
(-3.207) 
0.107** 
(2.17) 
ΔFirm voljt -0.016*** 
(-2.707) 
-0.016*** 
(-3.077) 
 -0.005 
(-0.818) 
-0.009 
(-1.411) 
-0.024 
(-1.27) 
Loc exc retjt -0.121*** 
(-3.294) 
0.154*** 
(2.794) 
 -0.146*** 
(-5.399) 
0.017 
(0.465) 
-0.13** 
(-2.424) 
ΔLoc voljt 0.005 
(0.809) 
0.02*** 
(3.768) 
 -0.005 
(-0.85) 
0.007 
(1.266) 
0.038* 
(1.903) 
   
 
   Fixed effect Y Y  N N N 
Adj-R2 0.12 0.26  0.12 0.19 0.08 
N 1359 1071  1359 1071 288 
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Table A.4. Supplementary Regression Tests of spillover to non-cross-listed firms’ corporate 
risk 
 
Δ(CCDSi jt) = αi + βΔ(CCRjt) + λDi Δ (CCRjt) + γΔXi jt + δt Di + εi j  
 
 Dummy Fixed Effect  Robust Heteroscedasticity OLS 
 
All 
CCR 
Negative 
CCR 
 All 
CCR 
Negative 
CCR 
Positive 
CCR 
βΔ(CCRjt)           0.061* 
(1.81) 
0.159*** 
(2.927) 
 0.064*** 
(2.709) 
0.159*** 
(3.669) 
-0.071 
(-0.43) 
λDi Δ(CCRjt) 0.124*** 
(3.136) 
0.205*** 
(3.434) 
 0.100*** 
(3.77) 
0.170*** 
(3.564) 
-0.181 
(-1.054) 
Firm exc retjt -0.126*** 
(-4.202) 
-0.060*** 
(-1.494) 
 -0.101*** 
(-4.159) 
-0.082*** 
(-2.755) 
0.107 
(2.074) 
ΔFirm voljt -0.014** 
(-2.501) 
-0.015*** 
(-2.992) 
 -0.004*** 
(-0.659) 
-0.007*** 
(-1.116) 
-0.026 
(-1.337) 
Loc exc retjt -0.139*** 
(-3.851) 
0.131*** 
(2.535) 
 -0.158*** 
(-6.02) 
0.017*** 
(0.502) 
-0.123 
(-2.201) 
ΔLoc voljt 0.002 
(0.454) 
0.018*** 
(3.513) 
 -0.007*** 
(-1.156) 
0.006*** 
(1.048) 
0.042 
(2.119) 
D            0.080*** 
(7.516) 
0.170*** 
(13.591) 
 0.042*** 
(1.086) 
0.089*** 
(1.362) 
0.076 
(1.078) 
 
  
 
   Fixed effect Y Y  N N N 
Adj-R2 0.14 0.28  0.12 0.20 0.08 
N 1359 1071  1359 1071 288 
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